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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC USE OF REASON IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: JOHN 
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September 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis analyzes public use of reason in a comparative perspective 
concerning John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas’s approaches. Public reason is 
important in constitutional democracies to define the relations between the state and 
the citizens and their relations to each other. Rawls and Habermas are known to 
provide major concepts in deliberative democracy. Their interpretations of similar 
concepts and their evaluation of similar ideas brings them to a fruitful debate 
concerning the future of deliberative democracy in general.  
In this thesis the idea of public reason is presented from the point of view of 
John Rawls. The philosophical roots of the idea of public reason are examined. 
Habermas’s insights concerning public use of reason is analyzed. Finally the debate 
 iv 
between Rawls and Habermas concerning the idea of public reason is presented. This 
thesis aims to indicate the importance of public reason in the context of democratic 
thought. It also analyzes an important debate that might contribute to new 
developments in the future of theory of deliberative democracy. In conclusion this 
thesis argues that in a pluralistic society public use of reason enables us to reach a 
legitimate ground for deliberative democracy without lapsing into politics of interest 
and power politics.  
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 Bu tez kamusal akıl kavramını John Rawls ve Jürgen Habermas’ın 
yaklaşımlarıyla karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemektedir. Anayasal demokrasilerde 
kamusal alan, vatandaşlarla devlet arasındaki ilişkileri ve vatandaşların kendi 
aralarındaki ilişkileri belirlemesi açısından önemlidir. Rawls ve Habermas 
“müzakereci demokrasi” kuramına önemli kavramları kazandırmaları bağlamında 
tanınmaktadırlar. Benzer kavramları araştırmaları ve benzer düşünceleri 
yorumlamaları, müzakereci demokrasinin geleceği açısından önemli bir tartışmayı 
başlatmalarına neden olmuştur.  
 Bu tezde kamusal akıl kavramı John Rawls’un bakış açısından incelenmiştir. 
Ayrıca kamusal akıl kavramının felsefi kaynakları araştırılmıştır. Habermas’ın 
 vi 
kamusal aklın kullanımı hakkında yaptığı çalışmalar incelenmiştir. Son olarak Rawls 
ve Habermas arasında kamusal akıl çerçevesinde geçen tartışma sunulmuştur. Bu tez 
demokratik düşüncede kamusal aklın önemini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca 
müzakereci demokrasi kuramına gelecekte katkı sağlayabilecek önemli bir tartışmayı 
irdelemektedir.  Sonuç olarak, kamusal akıl çoğulcu toplumda müzakereci 
demokrasinin çıkar ve güç ilişkilerinde şekillenen siyasal yapıya düşmeden meşru bir 
temelde yerleşmesini sağlamaktadır.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Deliberative democracy aims at developing deliberative structures into more 
effective instruments in order to grasp the problems constitutional democracies have 
been entitled to deal with. These problems are around recent practices in the modern 
society. For instance democratic practices leave too much attention on self-interest, 
they contribute to social fragmentation, progress of inequalities, and eventually they 
end up ignoring poor, marginalized and powerless sections in the society. 
Deliberative democracy is believed to smoothen most of the discrepancies in 
contemporary democratic processes. Two prominent philosophers provided the 
theory of deliberative democracy with crucial insights: John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas.  
 In Political Liberalism, Rawls attempts to reconcile various comprehensive 
worldviews in society to come into terms with a single conception of justice. Thus a 
stable and effectively regulated constitutional democracy will be realized. Habermas 
tries to construct a theory of communication as a remedy to increasing technicality 
in modern society. For him, in democratic processes sincere commitment of 
individuals to the principles of democracy can be accomplished through 
communicatively regulated deliberative devices. Following Kant’s insights in 
practical philosophy both Rawls and Habermas developed instruments to effectively 
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regulate deliberative processes. According to Rawls, the idea of public reason is one 
of the main ideas of political liberalism that prescribes the way in which society 
formulates its plans and makes its decisions. Habermas’s discourse ethics aims at 
regulating the procedural conditions of deliberative processes. Although they share 
the similar starting point from Kant’s moral theory, Rawls and Habermas come up 
with different strategies for deliberative processes. The differentiation is first, 
mainly the result of their conceived predecessors in political theory. For instance, 
Rawls is influenced from Rousseau and Mill whereas Habermas is influenced from 
linguistic philosophy. Second, the differences occur in Rawls and Habermas’s 
positions in political theory where the former manifests his position as a liberal and 
the latter not. In order to grasp the theory of deliberative democracy it is essential to 
understand these interpretations from two leading philosophers concerning basic 
principles of deliberative processes.  
 This thesis examines the idea of public reason as a regulative device of 
deliberative processes in constitutional democracies. The idea of public reason is 
presented in detail in its relation to John Rawls’s Political Liberalism and in the 
general context of political philosophy. In the context of different approaches 
between Rawls and Habermas, public reason becomes centrally important because it 
is the source of a debate between the two. Clarifying the idea of public reason in the 
debate between Rawls and Habermas is the basic aim of this thesis. In this sense, the 
thesis also analyzes the position of Habermas in relation to democratic theory and 
his conception of discourse ethics in comparison to public reason. This thesis 
intends to contribute to the theory of democracy by analyzing this important debate 
and its trajectories in the history of political thought.   
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 In the second chapter, I evaluate John Rawls’s approach to politics in 
general. I will first present the basic concepts, which will be used during the thesis. 
Rawls’s intention in developing A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism is 
analyzed. Main ideas in Political Liberalism are emphasized, such as the priority of 
right, the idea of overlapping consensus, and the idea of public reason. Then the idea 
of public reason is evaluated in detail. Public reason attributes a distinctive 
characteristic to political liberalism in relation to other liberalisms, in general – 
moral liberalism, economic liberalism, utilitarian liberalism. The emphasis on public 
reason indicates the importance of certain political values that differentiate itself 
from moral and utilitarian liberalism. The application of public reason is limited to 
the public discussions, held in the public forum for citizens. It is limited to the 
discussions in the legislative for the public officers and to the decisions of the 
judiciary. Public reason is limited to the issues of constitutional essentials and 
fundamental matters of justice. In this sense the limits are an important issue in 
dealing with the idea of public reason. Also, the conditions for reasoning in the 
public are studied. The conception of the public in Rawlsian terms is specifically 
important because of the meaning Rawls attributes to the public. Public reason is 
public (1) as the reason of citizens, (2) it is concerned with the good of the public 
and matters of fundamental justice, and (3) its content is public. There is a 
disagreement between Rawls and Habermas at this point which I elaborate in 
chapter five in detail. Finally, in the same chapter important aspects of political 
liberalism related with public reason are analyzed. These are the ideal of citizenship, 
non-public reasons and procedural versus substantive aspects in Rawls’s approach.  
 In the third chapter, philosophical roots of the idea of public reason are 
evaluated. My main argument is that Rawls is influenced from Jean-Jacques 
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Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant in developing the idea of public 
reason. Public uses of reason should have its roots in the history of political 
philosophy. It is thus crucial to understand which aspects of Rawls’s theory are 
influenced from these philosophers and which aspects are novel in his approach. It is 
also important to search for the philosophical roots since Habermas share the same 
starting point with Rawls from Kant’s practical philosophy. Moreover it will help us 
to locate the idea of public reason in the general context of democratic theory. In this 
chapter, Rousseau’s ideas on general will formation and citizenship are presented. 
Then, Mill’s insights on liberty are analyzed in its priority and limits. Also his 
conception in evaluating priority of right is presented. Finally, Kant’s concept of 
public uses of reason is analyzed, and the idea of categorical imperative is presented 
with a special emphasis.  
 In the fourth chapter Habermas’s theory and his concept of discourse ethics 
is presented in detail. This chapter intends to point out Habermas’s contributions to 
the theory of democracy in general and his ideas related to public uses of reason. 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action is one of the most important 
contributions to social theory. Depending on communicative action, discourse ethics 
aims at defining principles of deliberation through discourse principle. Discourse 
ethics tries to construct an understanding of discourse principle in its application to 
normal life conditions and its relation to free will of the individuals. It does not 
provide a substantive definition of a moral conception but lays down rules of the 
game for a procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy. This point is the 
main point of controversy between discourse ethics and public reason. This chapter 
will help us to understand the arguments from the point of view of Habermas before 
we deal with the debate.  
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 In the fifth chapter the debate between Rawls and Habermas is presented. 
Main points of disagreement are evaluated one by one with a special emphasis on 
public reason. The criticisms of both Rawls and Habermas against each other’s 
arguments are analyzed in detail. In the first place the idea of original position and 
ideal discourse situation are compared. Both original position and ideal discourse 
situation are devices of representation. Original position is a situation in which 
persons decide to choose the principles of justice without knowing their social and 
natural status in the society. It is an abstract mental construction. In the ideal 
discourse situation participants are socialized in similar conditions so that they are 
capable of understanding and judging each other’s truth claims. The ideal discourse 
situation defines a starting point before the deliberation starts in the public. Second, 
overlapping consensus and justification are evaluated. The condition that citizens of 
every reasonable comprehensive worldview accept a shared conception of justice is 
the fact of overlapping consensus. Habermas takes the point that overlapping 
consensus aims at the justification of Rawls’s theory. On the contrary Rawls does 
not totally accept this argument. Third, private and public autonomy is compared. 
The conceptions of private and public as well as private and public autonomy are 
different in Rawls and Habermas. Rawls tries to limit public reason to escape from 
comprehensive argumentations whereas Habermas tries to include all in the public 
deliberation. Finally, procedural and substantive aspects of the debate are presented 
and discussed.  
 In this thesis I try to clarify premises of public use of reason. My argument is 
that understanding public use of reason is important because it defines a possible 
common ground in pluralistic society. Public use of reason gives us the possibility of 
going beyond private uses of reason. In other terms, public reason is a way to 
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overcome politics of interest. Moreover public use of reason enables us to found a 
legitimate ground for democracy against power politics. Public reason also makes it 
possible to go beyond liberal individualism. Through public use of reason liberal 
democracies are tried to be transformed into more participatory and deliberative 
practices by appealing to egalitarianism and publicness. Public reason makes it 
possible that justice can be considered at the center of a legitimate political structure 
against considerations for mere stability. By putting questions of justice at the center 
of political debates, public use of reason aims to sustain a legitimate and stable 
constitutional democracy.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
 
 
 
 John Rawls is one of the most influential theorists of our time. His influential 
work, A Theory of Justice, (1971) attracted great many attentions. It has the feature 
of being the most important theoretical framework in liberal theory against the 
utilitarian liberalism and prominent libertarian theories. A Theory of Justice intended 
to found a systematic framework against utilitarianism due to the fact that for Rawls, 
utilitarianism is weak to provide a basis for constitutional democracies. On this 
prospect, a more general idea of the social contract is envisioned in A Theory of 
Justice. Rawls tries to develop a specific conception of justice for constitutional 
democracies. (Rawls, 1999a: xi-xvi) His concern is how to find a basic conception 
that allows various comprehensive worldviews, sometimes even contradicting ones, 
to live together in peace and harmony. The concept of justice is a starting point in 
defining a conception that is acceptable by a plurality of worldviews.  
 In this chapter, I briefly present Rawls’s political position in general and 
analyze his concept of public reason in detail. As a starting point, in the first part, I 
examine his basic concepts, including public reason. In the second part I evaluate 
Rawls’s theory as a whole. I try to indicate his aim and the evolution of his ideas in 
political theory. How Rawls developed A Theory of Justice and how he revised it to 
 8 
find a more general conception towards Political Liberalism is presented. The 
fundamental concepts of political liberalism are explained with the intention to 
indicate the importance of the idea of public reason. In the third part, the society as a 
fair system of cooperation is analyzed. Public conception of justice and basic 
principles are explained in relation to public reason. In the fourth part, three 
fundamental ideas of political liberalism are presented. Two basic principles of 
justice as fairness are mentioned here. The first fundamental idea is the priority of 
right. Related to the priority of right, second fundamental idea of political liberalism 
is the overlapping consensus. The third idea is the public reason. Although very long 
in content, previous parts are evaluated to bring the discussion to the idea of public 
reason. In analyzing the idea of public reason, first limits of public reason are 
presented. Second, aspects of reasoning in public are evaluated to understand the 
procedure of public reason. Third, the concept of public is analyzed in understanding 
the idea of public reason. After explaining public reason I turn to the related 
conceptions in political liberalism. For this in the fifth part, I presented the ideal of 
citizenship. This part indicates features of Rawlsian conception of citizen who is the 
sole reasoner in public. In the sixth part, nonpublic reasons are presented. Finally in 
the seventh part procedural and substantive aspects of public reason are analyzed. 
This part will help us to further the discussion on public reason in the coming 
chapters.  
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2.1. Basic Concepts of Political Liberalism 
 
For a more complete understanding of Rawls’s specific conception of justice 
and his later attempt in revising his conception in Political Liberalism, now I 
attempt to clarify his concepts in brief comments. There are basically nine concepts 
that are crucial to understand the ideas in political liberalism. Also some minor 
concepts are given briefly in relation to these major concepts. The concepts that are 
presented here are well-ordered society, justice as fairness, the original position, the 
reasonable and the rational, reasonable pluralism, civic citizenship, overlapping 
consensus, public reason and the background culture. 
 
 
2.1.1. A Well-Ordered Society 
 
 According to Rawls, a definition for a conception of justice requires the 
definition of a conception of society. A society is a collectivity of persons who 
expect certain advantages from it. This collectivity should provide mutual 
advantages to operate effectively. The idea of mutually advantageous situation 
indicates a structure of mutual cooperation. The mutual advantage of persons in a 
society is the common good of society. However, every person has a personal 
interest which inevitably contrasts with the common good of society. In order to 
solve the discrepancies between individual interests and the common good, a set of 
principles is used, known as justice. In the Rawlsian terminology a well-ordered 
society is a society that is effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. 
Being regulated by a public conception of justice means that: 
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… [I]t is a society in which [1] everyone accepts and knows that the others 
accept the same principles of justice, and [2] the basic social institutions 
generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles. 
(Rawls, 1999a: 4)  
 
A public conception of justice indicates persons’ commitment to leave their personal 
interests at the expense of a shared conception of justice.  In other types of societies 
persons’ conceptions of justice differs so that a common ground is not possible to be 
reached. When Rawls uses the concept of well-ordered society he means a society in 
which there is a general understanding of a political conception of justice. A well-
ordered society is a society in which persons are assumed to accept the principles of 
justice and basic social institutions are assumed to satisfy the principles of justice.  
 
 
2.1.2. Justice as Fairness 
 
 In A Theory of Justice Rawls develops a specific conception of justice that is 
called justice as fairness. Justice as fairness is a public conception of justice in a 
well-ordered society. The terms and conditions of justice are designed to construct 
the basic structure of society. Principles of justice are considered at the very basic 
level of founding a society.  
[Principles of justice] are the principles that free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position 
of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These 
principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of 
social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government 
that can be established. (Rawls, 1999a: 10)  
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Principles of justice as fairness define the principles of a fair system of cooperation. 
These principles are:  
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for 
all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, 
are to be guaranteed their fair value. 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they 
are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 1996: 6) 
  
As fundamental principles of justice as fairness, these principles are to regulate basic 
institutions of society. The principles also provide values of political liberalism 
through a public conception of justice. 
 
 
2.1.3. The Original Position 
 
 In A theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to find a general theory that replaces 
classical social contract theories. In social contract theories an abstract, hypothetical 
initial situation is conceptualized, which is the state of nature, and a contract is 
formed to construct the conditions of living together. Justice as fairness is founded 
upon the conception that a person does not enter a society through a contract but 
through accepting a particular conception of justice. Persons in an initial position of 
equality accept justice as fairness. Similar to the conception of state of nature in 
social contract theories, Rawls conceptualizes the original position. The original 
position states that: in the initial stage;  
… [N]o one knows his place in the society, his class position or social 
status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. (Rawls, 1999a: 11)  
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Persons decide to choose the principles of justice without knowing their social and 
natural status in the society. This condition of not knowing essential personal 
features is called the veil of ignorance. Through the idea of original position Rawls 
aims at developing a society in which no one becomes advantaged or disadvantaged 
by chance. Consequently, the principles of justice they are going to decide do not 
favor any particular group or person in the society. It is because no one would know 
their respective status and their conception of good in the society properly before 
deciding a particular conception of justice.  
 
 
2.1.4. Reasonable and Rational 
 
 The importance and centrality of reason in political theory is closely 
connected with liberalism. The rational person as such has the basic industry of 
reasoning in every matter of life. Rawls differentiates reasonable from rational in 
considering the conception of justice as fairness. Being rational does not necessarily 
mean being reasonable. Rational agents pursue their own interests intelligently. 
Reasonable agents in the society are concerned with the fact that they are living in a 
society with others in a fair system of cooperation. In this sense, reasonable agents 
consider the impact of their actions on others in the society while they pursue their 
own interests as rational agents. In the context of justice as fairness being reasonable 
has a specific importance.  
Persons are reasonable in one aspect when, among equals say, they are 
ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and 
to abide them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. 
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Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore 
as justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others 
propose. (Rawls, 1996: 49)  
 
Being reasonable is not out of a rational calculation of persons to conclude that they 
abide with the principles of justice as fairness as far as their rational interests are 
maximized when the common good is favored. Being reasonable confers a moral 
responsibility unlike being rational. In the public, reasonable agents are concerned 
with the fair terms of cooperation to contribute to justice as fairness. On the 
contrary, being rational does not presuppose a public condition. Being rational is 
considered at the individual level. Rationality is a condition for individual persons, 
whereas reasonableness presumes the existence of others.  
 
 
2.1.5. Reasonable Pluralism 
 
 Democracy is a regime which includes people who adhere to different 
comprehensive worldviews. In constitutional democracies, this fact of pluralism of 
different worldviews is accepted as given. Although in democracies the existence of 
different and contending worldviews is part of the political culture, in a 
constitutional democracy founded on the principles of justice as fairness this 
pluralism should carry certain characteristics. The kind of pluralism justice as 
fairness operates in, is reasonable pluralism. In reasonable pluralism only those 
worldviews are accepted as part of the political system which reasonable citizens 
accept to endorse. In political liberalism comprehensive worldviews are considered 
as reasonable views as far as citizens who accept those views agree with the 
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principles of justice as fairness. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines invoke their 
followers to comply with the principles of a reasonable conception of justice. For the 
existence of different comprehensive worldviews in the society they have to be 
considered as reasonable worldviews. Justice as fairness in a well-ordered society is 
at the center of all different reasonable comprehensive worldviews and does not 
favor any of them.  
 
 
2.1.6. Civic Citizenship 
 
 The political relation of citizens in a constitutional democracy is 
characterized around a civic friendship of citizens. Civic friendship is founded upon 
the principles of a shared conception of justice. The fact of reasonableness further 
strengthens the condition of civic friendship. Every citizen appreciates the civic 
limits for realizing a well-ordered society which is designed through a certain shared 
conception of justice. In a well-ordered society citizens have a duty of civility. This 
duty states that every citizen is ready to explain his commitment to one another on 
the principles of justice as fairness. This duty is the unofficial guarantee for a shared 
conception of justice to endure. The ideal of civic citizenship is developed around 
the duty of civility to realize civic friendship. 
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2.1.7. Overlapping Consensus 
 
 In the condition of reasonable pluralism a certain conception of justice is said 
to balance different comprehensive worldviews. The condition that citizens of every 
reasonable comprehensive worldview accept the shared conception of justice is the 
fact of overlapping consensus.  
Social unity is based on a consensus on the political conception; and 
stability is possible when the doctrines making up the consensus are 
affirmed by society’s politically active citizens and the requirements of 
justice are not too much in conflict with citizens’ essential interests as 
formed and encouraged by their social arrangements. (Rawls, 1996: 134)  
 
Overlapping consensus is not a mere consensus on basic matters of justice but it 
requires the commitment of those who accept the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
Overlapping consensus aims at assuring stability among different comprehensive 
worldviews in the society. The term overlapping indicates that the political 
conception of justice is not against, ignorant or skeptical about various 
comprehensive doctrines but it is acceptable to all those views.  
We try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor to deny any particular 
comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral view, or its associated 
truth and the status of values. Since we assume each citizen to affirm some 
such view, we hope to make it possible for all to accept the political 
conception as true or reasonable from the standpoint of their own 
comprehensive view, whatever it may be. (Rawls, 1996: 150) 
 
Overlapping consensus, in this sense, is not for reaching a consensus as it is a modus 
vivendi, but it tries to accomplish an idea for which various comprehensive doctrines 
might reasonably endorse to a political conception of justice. It is political in the 
sense that it takes only issues of basic justice and constitutional essentials into 
account in public deliberation.  
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2.1.8. Public Reason 
 
 Public reason is the reason of citizens in a constitutional regime who share a 
public conception of justice in a society as a fair system of cooperation. It is also the 
reason of the public in a condition of reasonable pluralism where the public 
conception of justice stands for providing a framework for overlapping consensus 
among various comprehensive worldviews.  
The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and 
political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic 
government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In 
short, it concerns how the political relation is to be understood. (Rawls, 
2001: 132)  
 
The relation among citizens is generally defined through the public conception of 
justice. Public reason is to effectively regulate the conditions in which citizens come 
together in the public forum to decide the principles of basic justice. Public reason in 
this sense is an integral part of political liberalism. In other words, it defines the 
procedural rules in which political liberalism operates. The idea of overlapping 
consensus indicates that citizens affirm public reason from inside their 
comprehensive worldviews.  
 
 
2.1.9. Background Culture 
 
 Background culture is developed in order to differentiate the true conception 
of public in political liberalism. Background culture is the culture of civil society. 
Nevertheless, the background culture is not out of the scope of legal political 
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system. (Rawls, 2001: 134) Public reason cannot interfere with the operation of 
background culture since background culture does not constitute a political 
conception in the society. Background culture is different from the public political 
culture. Background culture is not fully concerned with the private lives of persons, 
it is rather the social environment in the society. The associations that comprise the 
background culture are universities, religious institutions, professional groups and 
the like. (Rawls, 1996: 220-223) 
 Until this point basic concepts as tools of analysis are evaluated. In the 
coming section foundational ideas of political liberalism are going to be analyzed in 
detail. Rawls’s intention in developing A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism 
is presented. This section will enable us to move into the analysis of society as a fair 
system of cooperation and the basic ideas of political liberalism.  
 
 
2.2. From Theory to Political Liberalism 
 
 The originality of John Rawls as a political philosopher lies in his conviction 
that his scholarly work is matured in a time span among scientific circles on the 
basis of deliberation for prospective ideas. Consequently, he revised his monumental 
work – A Theory of Justice – by considering many criticisms posed in time also with 
a change in his scope of analysis although he still aimed at the possibility of a just 
society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens of a 
constitutional democracy. For Rawls, liberal doctrines are constructed upon 
metaphysical bases. Thus they are considered as comprehensive worldviews. The 
metaphysical basis can be a moral regulative idea, or a conception such as nation or 
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utility. A Theory of Justice can be counted among the liberal tradition providing a 
comprehensive doctrine as opposed to utilitarian liberalism. A Theory of Justice is 
based upon a specific conception of justice. However, Rawls’s main aim is to find a 
conception that enables various contending comprehensive worldviews to live 
together without appealing to a metaphysical conception. A Theory of Justice offers 
a conception of justice but it remains to be another comprehensive worldview. It is 
unlikely that others are willing to accept such a conception. In this sense, A Theory 
of Justice is revised to endorse the idea of citizenship as sharing the same 
commitment to justice as fairness. In his later work Political Liberalism, Rawls 
revised his ideas in A Theory of Justice towards providing a framework which does 
not entail a comprehensive worldview but an overlapping consensus among many 
different comprehensive doctrines.  
… [I]n the well ordered society of justice as fairness, citizens hold the same 
comprehensive doctrine, and this includes aspects of Kant’s comprehensive 
liberalism, to which the principles of justice as fairness belong. (Rawls, 
1996: xlii)  
 
However, in a constitutional democratic society citizens should not be forced to 
adhere to a specific comprehensive view, be it the comprehensive view of justice as 
fairness.  
 According to Rawls the fact of reasonable pluralism suggests the existence 
of different and various comprehensive worldviews either religious or secular while 
citizens affirm the existence of this plurality. “Thus, a main aim of political 
liberalism is to show that the idea of the well-ordered society in Theory may be 
formulated so as to take account of the fact of reasonable pluralism.” (Rawls, 1996: 
xliii) In Political Liberalism the idea of reasonable pluralism is contained in the 
main structure of the social set up. Unlike A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism 
 19 
is founded around a basic question. How is it possible to found a constitutional 
democratic regime in a society which is divided among various comprehensive 
worldviews? As a solution, the idea of justice as fairness in Theory is revised to 
form a political conception of justice in line with the idea of reasonable pluralism. 
(Beitz, 2000: 670-673) 
 Beyond the specific conception of the citizen in relation to a political 
conception of justice as fairness, which is elaborated in the first part of Political 
Liberalism, the structural concepts of the idea of reasonable pluralism are amongst 
the most important concepts. The ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason 
constitute the theoretical framework on which the idea of reasonable pluralism 
stands. The idea of overlapping consensus is to avoid a kind of consensual situation 
in relation to existing comprehensive doctrines. It is to find balance among various 
comprehensive worldviews along the lines of a public conception of justice. Indeed, 
overlapping consensus is located above the existing comprehensive doctrines within 
a regulative framework free from existing doctrines. As a result, the idea of 
overlapping consensus is acceptable to all of the views in connection with a 
reasonable political conception of justice. The problem at this point is how this 
political conception is decided? In a constitutional democracy matters of basic 
justice and constitutional essentials are left to legislative structures. In Political 
Liberalism, they are considered at the level of constitutional essentials with a 
conceptualization of reasonableness. Political liberalism on the one hand accepts the 
existence of a plurality of views in the society, on the other hand it develops an idea 
of civic citizenship. It is the responsibility of citizens in a democratic polity to 
contribute to the working of institutional processes of collective decision making 
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and implementing. The ideal of civic citizenship is grounded through public reason 
with a procedural context of decision-making at the very basic level.  
 The idea of public reason is not originally raised by Rawls in political theory. 
Rawls developed the concept of public reason as one of the fundamental ideas of 
Political Liberalism and as an integral part of it. Attempts to identify terms and 
conditions of citizens’ relations with government and with each other comprise an 
important literature in the theories of democracy. The most important novelty in 
Rawls’s understanding of the idea of public reason is that it is not founded upon a 
metaphysical conception. According to Rawls, the idea of public reason is assumed 
to solve his basic problem, which concerns the possibility of the existence of 
contending comprehensive worldviews living together.  
 
 
2.3. Society as a Fair System of Cooperation 
 
 The legitimacy of constitutional democracies should be based on the concept 
of justice that could be accepted by all citizens. “Only a political conception of 
justice that all citizens might be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as a basis 
of public reason and justification.” (Rawls, 1996: 137) In a constitutional democracy 
all citizens as reasonable, rational agents act in cooperation with each other. The 
way the rules of the game are going to be decided, in a way, is left to the procedural 
working of public reason. The idea of justice, as Rawls understood needs 
clarification in the sense that it is considered as one of the main ingredients in the 
construction of the constitutional democratic regime.  
 21 
 When Rawls talks about a political conception of justice, he also means the 
concept of justice as fairness. Justice as fairness draws the boundaries in the political 
society to realize the conditions of equality and freedom. On this path, citizens may 
endorse the idea of justice as fairness as a common ground for the realization of 
overlapping consensus, by leaving their comprehensive doctrines aside. The 
conceptualization of justice as fairness is not comprehensive for the fact that it 
handles basic political matters as practical matters. This political aspect of the idea 
of justice as a fair system of cooperation enables many different comprehensive 
worldviews to settle under the framework of overlapping consensus. “The aim of 
justice as fairness, then is practical: it presents itself as a conception of justice that 
may be shared by citizens as a basis of a reasoned, informed and willing political 
agreement.” (Rawls, 1996: 9) Justice that does not depend on any comprehensive 
doctrine and specific worldview is attractive to almost all different views in the 
society to become the basis of political society. The idea of overlapping consensus is 
like a module in the society as a fair system of cooperation that can be practically 
inserted to any comprehensive doctrine.  
 
 
2.4. Fundamental Ideas of Political Liberalism 
 
 Justice as fairness provides two basic principles to solve fundamental 
problems of constitutional democracies. They are to solve the problems of liberty 
and equality. These two principles are:  
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for 
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all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, 
are to be guaranteed their fair value. 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they 
are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 1996: 6) 
  
As fundamental principles of justice as fairness, these principles are to 
regulate the basic institutions of the society. These principles also provide values of 
political liberalism through a public conception of justice.  
Justice as fairness develops in society as a fair system of cooperation. In such 
a society, citizens are expected to endorse the shared public conception of justice. 
Terms and conditions of the development of the idea of society as a fair system of 
cooperation depend on the procedural requirements for the rules of the game. The 
cooperation is regulated by the rules adopted through democratic procedures. The 
social system inherently carries a specific notion of cooperation resembling to an 
idea of reciprocity. The idea of reciprocity states a reciprocal situation for citizens in 
accepting the terms of cooperation. “… [T]hese are terms that each participant may 
reasonably accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them.” (Rawls, 
1996: 16) Reciprocally advantageous situation of citizens in society guarantees the 
idea of justice as a fair system of cooperation. The rules and regulations for the 
construction of society within a reciprocally advantageous conditionality would 
require a procedural setup that enables the participation of citizens effectively.  
Hence the idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity 
says: Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely 
believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we 
to state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also 
reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those 
reasons. (Rawls, 2001: 137)  
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One foremost primordial condition for the realization of this general goal is the 
constitutional democracy.  
 An effective constitutional democracy should guarantee basic rights and 
liberties of the individuals that are partaking in the decision making process. The 
first principle of political liberalism exactly states this condition as the founding 
principle of the general scheme. “Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties.” (Rawls, 1996: 5) With the help of the 
difference principle, the first principle, equality principle, becomes available to all. It 
is the fair equality of opportunity in relation to all public offices and positions, and 
providing conditions that is available to the least advantaged section of the society. 
These last two principles are known as the difference principle in political 
liberalism. Upon these conditions the political conception of justice constitutes 
regulative principles of a constitutional democracy. The citizens in the constitutional 
democracy would comply with the basic principles of justice as fairness. The 
constitution in this vein is the major document not only in the sense of defining 
basic framework of the society as a fair system of cooperation, but also in its 
becoming.  
 As the basic document in a constitutional democracy, constitution provides 
the general rules for every citizen in the society. Deciding on the constitutional 
essentials require consideration of basic matters of justice for a well-ordered society. 
Application of public reason in deciding constitutional essentials and basic matters 
of justice is a priority in establishing a stable and effective political society. After a 
basic standing ground is established, other political matters are negotiable in a well-
ordered way. “It is through these fixed procedures that people can express, even if 
they do not, their reasoned democratic will, and indeed without those procedures 
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they can have no such will.” (Rawls, 1996: 232) Appearing at this point, public 
reason at first provides the procedural architecture of arranging constitutional 
essentials and basic matters of justice.  
 
 
2.4.1. Priority of Right 
 
In a fair system of cooperation, the idea of priority of right is an important 
aspect of society.  
The particular meaning of the priority of right is that comprehensive 
conceptions of the good are admissible, or can be pursued in society, only if 
their pursuit conforms to the political conception of justice. (Rawls, 1996: 
176)  
 
Citizens should comply with the priority of right in society as a fair system of 
cooperation over the goods for it is a required part of a shared public conception of 
justice. Still this priority remains in the context of practical matters of political 
system. “Political liberalism presents, then, a political conception of justice for the 
main institutions of political and social life, not for the whole life.” (Rawls, 1996: 
175) As a common ground among the citizens, this principle is to avoid undermining 
the fair system of cooperation for the sake of one specific comprehensive doctrine. 
At the same time it is devoted to regulate the institutional framework of the state 
which is not allowed to intervene in framing any of the reasonable worldviews.  
The priority of liberty implies in practice that a basic liberty can be limited 
or denied solely for the sake of one or more other basic liberties, and never 
(…) for reasons of public good or of perfectionist values. (Rawls, 1996: 
295)  
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This seems to be one of the basic assumptions of political liberalism which claims to 
assure the plurality of different and sometimes contending worldviews. What is the 
main ground for this condition in society as a fair system of cooperation? 
 
 
2.4.2. The Idea of Overlapping Consensus 
 
Reasonable pluralism is desired for the political culture of a democratic 
society. Political liberalism tries to avoid comprehensive doctrines to influence 
political issues unreasonably. In this way it is compulsory to state the guidelines for 
identifying the conditions in which people come together to decide on initial terms 
of decision-making. Reaching a consensus is a priority for the terms which will 
construct a framework for stability. Putting the consensus as a priority would entail 
the impossibility of a single or comprehensive view to be consolidated as the sole 
political view in a society. “… no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a 
political conception for a constitutional regime.”   (Rawls, 1996: 135) An 
overlapping consensus on the political issues in a society makes the idea of political 
realm free from any particular view. Such a shared political view of a society is 
legitimate only in the eyes of its members. Then, one should ask how the members 
of the society balance the conditions of justice as fairness and constitutional 
essentials with their comprehensive worldviews? 
According to Rawls, the only condition for the possibility of political 
liberalism passes through the realization of an overlapping consensus. This only 
happens when citizens of a regime are supposed to born and live a complete life in 
the same society. It is their own society from the first day so that they would accept 
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the existing political conditions as well. Related with this fact, a society based on a 
single comprehensive doctrine inevitably requires the use of coercion. This is the 
fact of oppression according to Rawls. (Rawls, 1996: 35-40) On the contrary, in a 
constitutional democracy the power of coercion is exercised under the name of 
citizens as a collective body over themselves. The construction of this collective 
body depends on the realization of the idea of overlapping consensus in which 
citizens reasonably endorse the plurality of views and the legitimate exercise of 
power over them by the state. The true meaning of public reason is realized if there 
is an overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines on the 
principles of basic justice and constitutional essentials. This point shows us how 
Rawls considers the overlapping consensus as not merely a modus vivendi but a 
shared conception of justice as fairness.  
The coercive power of the state over individuals is inevitable. It is also the 
case in a constitutional democracy that citizens at the same time construct the 
conditions and limits for the exercise of this power. Nevertheless, there is a need for 
the basis of its legitimacy. The legitimate use of power depends on the constitutional 
essentials of the state. In a democratic society in which there is a plurality of 
different comprehensive views, how it would be possible to exercise power which is 
justifiable for every citizen, poses a central question. The citizens of such a society 
would set up constitutional essentials for the legitimate use of state power. The 
identification of practical political matters as distinct from matters of life assures the 
impartiality of the idea of overlapping consensus. Rawls tries to make available a 
political conception to be constructed for the affiliation of various citizens to the 
constitutional democracy. The only possible way for the citizens to accept a 
justifiable way of exercising the state power is through framing the political as it is 
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done through the principles of basic justice. This framework would define the 
general precepts on which public reason stands. 
 
 
2.4.3. The Idea of Public Reason 
 
The idea of public reason contributes to the idea of a well-ordered society by 
ensuring the measures for order and stability in a constitutional democracy. The aim 
of public reason is defined in terms of “a firm allegiance to a democratic society’s 
political (moral) ideals and values.” (Rawls, 2001: 146) The order and stability is the 
natural outcome of a just constitutional democracy. In a polity where the ideals of a 
constitutional democracy are exercised for the sake of civic peace and stability, the 
true political values would not be realized. In this kind of polity, first sincere 
opinions of citizens would not be voiced; second the consensus on which the polity 
stands would be quite vulnerable. It would be a mere modus vivendi rather than an 
overlapping consensus. An overlapping consensus is based on a shared conception 
of justice on political issues that every citizen is expected to endorse.  
Public reason attributes a distinctive characteristic to political liberalism in 
relation to other liberalisms, in general – moral liberalism, economic liberalism, 
utilitarian liberalism. Political liberalism favors liberal principles like the priority of 
right, but its emphasis on public reason indicates the importance of political values 
that differentiates itself from moral and utilitarian liberalism. Public reason endorses 
a liberal, but also a political view of justice. It is liberal in the sense that it accepts 
the general founding principles of constitutional democracies, it is impartial and it 
provides tools to its members for them to exercise their rights. It is political because 
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it is concerned with the issues of basic justice and constitutional essentials which are 
also public. The idea of public reason contains the ways in which citizens exercise 
their basic rights and duties. For this basic purpose there are intrinsic values in their 
relation to the values of a liberal political conception. “ – the values of public reason 
– fall under the guidelines for public inquiry, which make that inquiry free and 
public.” (Rawls, 1996: 224) 
The ways of reasoning for public inquiry include general beliefs in line with 
common sense and realities proposed by science. These two basic convictions for 
inquiry are found in any liberal doctrine. In addition, it is proposed that any publicly 
reasonable form of inquiry should be accepted valid for public inquiry. This inquiry 
is called the content of public reason. It is not a specifically defined procedural 
content. On the contrary, public reason has a moral content; nevertheless it is not 
possible to identify it within a comprehensive worldview. This amorphous 
characteristic of public reason enables it to be applicable for many different 
contexts.  
We agree that citizens share in political power as free and equal, and that as 
reasonable and rational they have a duty of civility to appeal to public 
reason, yet we differ as to which principles are the most reasonable basis of 
public justification. (Rawls, 1996: 226)  
 
A difficulty arises at this point as how to assess any specific discussion to fell under 
the jurisdiction of public reasoning. The idea to limit public reason to identify the 
basic rights and duties and the basic matters of justice helps to identify this problem.   
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2.4.3.1. Limits of Public Reason 
 
The application of public reason is limited to the public discussions, held in 
the public forum for citizens. It is limited to the discussions in the legislator for the 
public officers and to the decisions of the judiciary. Public reason is limited to the 
issues of constitutional essentials and fundamental matters of justice. Public reason 
should first identify the political environment in which the democratic action is 
observed. The main reason in limiting public reason is more than a matter of priority 
of values and issues. Public reason is not contained in every aspect of life; also it is 
not a condition every citizen should apply in every decision they take. “But the ideal 
of public reason does hold for citizens when they engage in political advocacy in the 
public forum.” (Rawls, 1996: 215) The limits of public reason also constrain the use 
of it in terms of space and functionary. Public reason applies to whom has anything 
to do with the public, interpret constitution for enactment of laws and decide matters 
of basic justice. 
 The motivation to limit the public reason stems from the basic assumption 
that citizens should resort to an idea of public reason in deciding basic matters of 
justice. This idea should be under the framework of an overlapping consensus but 
not belong to a specific comprehensive view of any citizen. Citizens should be 
considering public reason related with certain issues so that their holistic 
conceptions of the world does not interfere with their reasoning. Limits of public 
reason ensure impartiality, which is also in compliance with the two basic principles 
of political liberalism. In everyday matters, people live in a world in accordance 
with their worldviews. They do not leave their comprehensive worldviews in the 
public as well. However, public reason is realized only when citizens consider the 
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inevitable plurality and existence of other comprehensive worldviews. Public reason 
is realized in any public forum where people are forced to argue within the 
considerations of constitutional democracy. Public, as a spatial constraint to public 
reason, assures plurality. (Charney, 1998: 98-99) The reason is that non-public 
issues will be out of the scope of political liberalism. Participants in the public 
discourse are not discriminated for non-public issues and reasonable plurality would 
be guaranteed.  
 
 
2.4.3.2. Reasoning in Public  
 
Limits on public reason do not mean that citizens would exclude reasoning 
from inside their comprehensive worldviews in the public forum. Rawls called this 
type of limit as the exclusive view. By contrast, reasoning stemming from 
comprehensive views may be included in the public reason as long as they 
contribute to the public reason, in a positive way. Rawls called this understanding as 
the inclusive view. Considering both views, the better one that fits into political 
liberalism is the inclusive view. However this situation should also be case-
dependent, in the sense that sometimes including reasoning from inside 
comprehensive views in deciding basic matters of justice may influence the public 
reason negatively. Any idea that is acceptable to a specific doctrine, if brought 
before the public, might be unreasonable for a political issue and might harm the 
overlapping consensus. “… [T]he appropriate limits of public reason vary depending 
on historical and social conditions.” (Rawls, 1996: 251) Consideration for including 
comprehensive reasoning in public reason depends on the political culture of the 
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society. Understanding the way any comprehensive view in the society supports the 
overlapping consensus would increase the level of social cooperation. “…[T]he best 
way to strengthen that ideal in such instances may be to explain in the public forum 
how one’s comprehensive doctrine affirms the political values.” (Rawls, 1996: 249) 
Rawls takes the adoption of inclusive views that can be understood as the 
transparency of comprehensive views in the society, under a conditional basis. It is 
the transparency of values to allow explanation of intrinsic qualities of every 
comprehensive doctrine publicly. 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls is decisive about the transparency of 
comprehensive doctrines in society unlike in the Theory. The transparency situation 
for explanations of comprehensive views is conditional in this instance. Later he is 
convinced by the full transparency for the manifestation of particular views in their 
own reasoning frameworks. “… [T]he roots of democratic citizens’ allegiance to 
their political conceptions lie in their respective comprehensive doctrines, both 
religious and non-religious.” (Rawls, 2001: 153) The ideas of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines should be transparent. To put in another way, they should 
be accessible by everyone. As a result, citizens’ compliance to the idea of public 
reason would be strengthened. Second, he is clear on the point of public justification 
in his later work. Whatever the consistency of reasoning commands in any 
comprehensive worldview, there should be a basis of public justification in the 
proposals.  
Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to 
others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think others 
could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably 
accept. (Rawls, 2001: 155)  
 
 32 
Justification is complete when others are taken into consideration in society. The 
reasonable pluralism requires this condition. After this point, reasoning would be 
complete.  
Reasoning from inside the comprehensive doctrines, provided that they 
comply with the overlapping consensus, does not overrule the idea of public reason. 
There is an exception that grounding any political institution solely or any 
comprehensive view jeopardizes the impartiality of reasoning before the 
consolidation of a just society is fully realized. In other words, the political culture 
of a society is crucial for the full realization of the values of political liberalism.  
What we cannot do in public reason is to proceed directly from our 
comprehensive doctrine, or a part thereof, to one or several political 
principles and values, and the particular institutions they support. Instead, 
we are required first to work to the basic ideas of a complete political 
conception and from there to elaborate its principles and ideals, and to use 
the arguments they provide. (Rawls, 2001: 146)  
 
The basic structure on which public reason stands should be completed beforehand 
in a mutually favorable political context. 
 
 
2.4.3.3. The Conception of Public  
 
 The identification of public in a well-ordered society is important to locate 
the idea of public reason as a regulative framework of relations among the citizens.  
While a well ordered democratic society is not an association, it is not a 
community either, if we mean by a community a society governed by a 
shared comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine. This fact is 
crucial for a well-ordered society’s idea of public reason. To think of a 
democracy as a community (so defined) overlooks the limited scope of its 
public reason founded on a political conception of justice. (Rawls, 1996: 
42)  
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Public reason is public in the sense that it has its own terms for the members of 
society to come together and discuss certain issues.  
Public reason, then, is public in three ways: as the reason of citizens as 
such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the good of the public and 
matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is public… 
(Rawls, 1996: 213)  
 
The citizens’ reason is not an aggregate reason but it is the reason shared by them 
for living in a society. As reasonable agents, citizens have the capacity to consider 
others for a fair cooperation in the public. The idea of good as an aim for public is 
not metaphysical because it is mainly concerned with fundamentals of justice. The 
matters concerning the fundamentals of justice are in the domain of political justice, 
and they are decided through discussion in the public forum. The content is not far 
reaching to many issues but only on basic principles. This is not to impose any kind 
of comprehensive view on the public. (Charney, 1998: 99-103) 
Public is the collective body of equal citizens. Citizens are free and equal 
with respect to their moral capacities which are “[T]he “capacity for a sense of 
justice and the capacity for a conception of the good.” (Rawls, 1996: 34) In this way 
it is possible for them to conceive a collective body of which they are part. “Their 
having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating 
members of society makes persons equal.” (Rawls, 1996: 19) Reasonable persons 
assure the validity of public to be a collective body of equal citizens. Citizens as a 
collective body exercise final political and coercive power over one another. The 
only legitimate way to execute the decisions in a democratic society is through a 
source of power formed collectively by free and equal citizens. The process of 
forming the collective body of citizens is realized in the initial agreement reached 
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through the device of the original position. Persons in an initial position of equality 
accept justice as fairness. 
 
 
2.5. The Ideal of Citizenship 
 
The task of legitimation is not vested solely on the state institutions. Rawls 
considered legitimacy in the mutual relationship of citizens among themselves with 
the state. Citizens have a responsibility in the mutual construction of a legitimate 
political environment.  
And since the exercise of a political power itself must be legitimate, the 
ideal of citizenship imposes a moral not a legal duty – the duty of civility – 
to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the 
principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the 
political values of public reason. (Rawls, 1996: 217)  
 
The only possible way in which a healthy constitutional democracy works is through 
making citizens responsible for their political decisions. The limits are imposed over 
citizens by citizens themselves. Democratic ideal of citizenship requires sincere 
commitment to the ideal of public reason.  
As reasonable and rational and knowing that they affirm a diversity of 
reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines, they should be ready to 
explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could 
reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their 
freedom and equality. (Rawls, 1996: 218)  
 
The political environment should be in line with this basic promise. Indeed politics 
provide an environment in which citizens are actively involved as sincere partners. 
Public reason is an instrument in achieving the construction of this environment. 
The guiding principle for citizens arguing in a public forum would be their response 
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to any particular problem as if they are acting as legislators or public officials. This 
is part of the civic responsibility of citizenship as much as the ideal of public reason 
is realized. 
Public reason encourages citizens to reason in public matters by considering 
others as committed to the same ideal. A feeling of doubt and skepticism with 
respect to truth supports this ideal and full commitment of citizens to an overlapping 
consensus.  
… [W]e should not appeal to the whole truth as we see it, even when it 
might be readily available. (Rawls, 1996: 218)  
Political liberalism views the insistence on the whole truth in politics as 
incompatible with democratic citizenship and the idea of legitimate law. 
(Rawls, 2001: 138)  
 
On the contrary, Bruce Brower argues that skepticism on the various comprehensive 
views does not contribute to public reason.  
The net result is that although skepticism may be consistent with appeal to 
public reason, it creates problems for liberalism itself, and does not provide 
independent support for the publicity constraint. (Brower, 1994: 22)  
 
According to Brower, skepticism should be backed by a desire to be reasonable. The 
desire to be reasonable as a motivation left alone to the general convictions of moral 
theory.  
… Rawls appeals to the burdens of reason, combined with the fact of 
pluralism (which Rawls believes is supported by the burdens of reason), in 
order to articulate a form of skepticism directed not at the truth of moral 
claims, but at the possibility of rational consensus on moral justification. 
(Brower, 1994: 21)  
 
The point Brower raised is quite logical but he is not clear in his claim that the 
weight of desire to be reasonable should be heavier. In this sense, public reason is 
affiliated more with the civic responsibility of citizens than Rawls presupposed. 
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However, Brower interpreted the element of skepticism in terms of Kantian 
constructivism rather than in terms for the construction of overlapping consensus.  
Political constructivism does not criticize, then religious, philosophical, or 
metaphysical accounts of the truth of moral judgments and of their validity. 
Reasonableness is its standard of correctness, and given its political aims, it 
need not go beyond that. (Rawls, 1996: 127)  
 
Skepticism in analyzing public reason is merely a part of reasoning in the public – a 
tool – than a moral principle in political liberalism. For Brower (1994) skepticism 
was in the basic precepts of moral conception. Rawls assumes that commitment to 
both reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and to the rights and duties of a just 
political regime would entail resurgence of ideal limits to the public reason, in an 
overlapping consensus. Limits on public reason in relation to overlapping consensus 
refer to the procedural limitations for the reasonable argumentation of citizens in 
public forum without harming overlapping consensus. Brower did not carefully 
assessed Rawls’s position. 
 
 
2.6. Non-public Reasons 
 
Public Reason is conceptualized around reasonableness of the agents at one 
point and it refers to the public that constitutes the idea of reasonableness at another. 
However, there is only one public and there are non-public reasons as such. The idea 
of public reason should be differentiated from the reasons of the parts which are 
agents in the public. “… [T]here are many nonpublic reasons and but one public 
reason.” (Rawls, 1996: 220) Also it is crucial to note that public reason is not the 
reason of public as an entity. A well-ordered democratic society; “…has no final 
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ends and aims in the way what persons or associations do.” (Rawls, 1996: 41) Public 
reason is limited to the public sphere, as Rawls understands. It is a way to ensure 
sincerity of citizens in their arguments. In other spheres of social life, namely 
background culture and nonpublic reasons, the freedom of thought and speech, 
freedom of association and other basic liberties allow discursive formations from the 
views of comprehensive arguments. “The idea of public reason does not apply to the 
background culture with its many forms of non-public reason nor to media of any 
kind.” (Rawls, 2001: 134) It is because public reason does not apply to private or 
non-public reasons. Rights of individuals should be secured through legal measures 
in constitutional democracies. If public reason were left to regulate private matters 
of individuals it would serve to establish a comprehensive doctrine. The attempt of 
Rawls is in line with his argument of the political justice. The ideas of political 
justice and society as a fair system of cooperation should embrace the public sphere 
but refrain from private conscience and non-public reasons.  
Power of non-public reasons over their participants in the constitutional 
democratic society is accepted and public reason does not interfere with this power. 
However the first basic principle of justice as fairness indicates that associations in 
the background culture should respect the rights of individuals. Public reason 
interferes in a situation where basic rights and liberties of a person is violated by 
non-public reasons. Any association in the background culture acknowledges a 
shared conception of justice. Accordingly, non-public reasons are ready to accept 
fair terms of cooperation in line with the principles of basic justice.   
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2.7. Procedural versus Substantive Aspects 
 
It is helpful to distinguish between the procedural and substantive aspects of 
the idea of public reason due to the fact that many controversial issues arise at this 
point. Public reason is neither totally procedural nor totally substantive but it 
contains aspects of each.  
They [political liberalisms] are required to specify the religious liberties 
and freedoms of artistic expression of equal citizens, as well as substantive 
ideas of fairness involving fair opportunity and ensuring adequate all-
purpose means, and much else. (Rawls, 2001: 141)  
 
Political liberalism is partially a substantive principle. For my usage of procedural is 
to indicate the weight of liberalism that was used in terms of the liberal principles of 
a constitutional democratic system. In the above quotation Rawls implicitly 
mentions this differentiation and sketches out the importance of proceduralism as 
legalism throughout his texts. 
Public reason as a procedural complement in the general framework of 
political liberalism is manifest in its affiliation to the Supreme Court. “… [I]n a 
constitutional regime with the judicial review, public reason is the reason of its 
supreme court.” (Rawls, 1996: 231) In the general context of constitutional 
essentials public reason is to realize the procedure for deciding the settlements of an 
inquiry. Once the constitutional essentials are decided through public reason, it is 
easy to analyze the lower legal arrangements for their validity. Public reason in this 
sense is a legal requirement. It is procedural to the extent it is legal. Other than the 
content of public reason, which is political, it is the procedure that the terms and 
conditions of a particular discussion were held on a certain ground. The idea of 
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public reason allows citizens to reach different solutions to an identical problem. In 
other words, there can be few reasonable answers for any question.  
In a situation where reasonable arguments are to settle on the same ground 
the idea of public reason operates as a mediating procedural instrument, although it 
has substantive aspects. The very basic idea itself operates reasonably. “A vote can 
be held on a fundamental question as on any other; and if the question is debated by 
appeal to political values and citizens vote their sincere opinion, the ideal is 
sustained.” (Rawls, 1996: 241) An appeal to the political values alone indicates the 
sustenance of the idea of public reason as a substantive idea. In addition, the 
procedure of voting among the reasonable opinions provides a procedural case for 
the solution of the debate. It is worth to conclude that procedural principles of 
reasonableness and being political create a vacuum in which no comprehensive 
doctrine dominates the public. Substantive aspects of public reason are an attempt to 
solve the problems of liberty and equality through two basic principles of equality 
and difference in political liberalism.  
 
 
2.8. Concluding Remarks 
 
The idea of public reason constitutes the aspects and rules of reasoning in the 
public forum in a well-ordered constitutional democracy. In the general framework 
of political liberalism, public reason is to solve the paradox between accommodating 
a shared understanding in the basic principles of justice and constitutional essentials, 
on the one hand and the inevitable plurality of conflicting comprehensive doctrines 
in society on the other. It first seems to be a merely procedural, legal principle. 
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However, public reason is understood to have a substantive characteristic that 
includes a form of civic responsibility. In this sense it is part of the republican ideal. 
Public reason defines the conditions of a social contract theory. Its moral 
responsibility over citizens as a civic friendship is similar to Rousseau’s conception 
of the Social Contract. Public reason’s attempt to find a framework that regulates 
basic matters of justice indicates the roots of Kantian constructivism. Rawls’s 
concern for the priority of right and his concern for liberty resembles to a kind of 
liberal understanding of liberty developed by J. S. Mill.  
Public reason is not only to settle down the disagreements in society or to 
decide the general rules of political conduct. It is a process in which a constitutional 
democracy develops further for better conditions and mutual respect. In the process 
regulated by public reason every citizen is expected to gain capacities akin to 
democratic citizenship in time.  
Citizens learn and profit from debate and argument, and when their 
arguments follow public reason, they instruct society’s political culture and 
deepen their understanding of one another even when agreement can not be 
reached. (Rawls, 2001: 171)  
 
Public reason is not exercised once and for all but open to public discussion all the 
time. Let me now turn to the foundations of public use of reason in political theory.  
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CHAPTER III 
PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON 
 
 
 
In the general framework of theories of democracy, Rawls stands for the 
realization of a project, known as the deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democracy calls for effective deliberation in public in modern societies. The 
automatic functioning of the voting process does not solve apathy and indifference 
in citizens. The project of deliberative politics is not only a novel proposal but it also 
proposes reevaluation of existing democratic principles. Accordingly, it turns back 
to original formulations of basic principles in the theory. It is crucial to understand 
the contributions of preceding philosophers and their intentions so that the process 
of reevaluation of democratic and deliberative principles may become complete. It is 
possible to trace basic concepts in Rawls’s Political Liberalism to their original 
philosophical roots. Three outstanding thinkers stand as the foundational figures in 
the development of Rawlsian theory; Rousseau, Mill and Kant. 
 In the analysis of public reason, I intend to understand Rawls’s approach to 
the problem of identifying terms and conditions of citizens’ relations with 
government and with each other within a plurality of different worldviews. Rawls 
tries to develop a conception of public reasoning to regulate the procedure in which 
all the citizens may actually express their own points of view. My first question is 
how did scholars of democracy react to the same problem. If Rawls is influenced 
from Rousseau, Mill and Kant in general, there should be reflections of public 
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reason in these philosophers’ thoughts. Not necessarily using the same concept of 
public reason as Rawls does, Rousseau, Mill and Kant searched for solving the 
problem of identifying terms and conditions of citizens’ relations with government 
and with each other. It should be noted that the basic problems of Rousseau, Mill, 
Kant and also Rawls are different. Rousseau tries to develop the foundations of a 
truly legitimate government in which everyone can participate in the realization of 
general will. Mill tries to find a way out of tyranny of majority. Kant adopts 
Rousseau’s concerns to a more elaborate philosophical inquiry. He tries to develop a 
universal moral conception for the general functioning of society. Rawls on the 
other hand tries to find a general theory that responds to the problem of finding a 
basic conception that allows various comprehensive worldviews, and even 
contradicting ones, to coexist in peace and harmony in the specific context of 
constitutional democracies.  
 My research question in this chapter is focused on the sources of Rawlsian 
public reason in the thoughts of Rousseau, Mill and Kant. For this purpose, I 
examined the basic texts of these thinkers from the point of view of their approaches 
to public reasoning. In the first part, I analyzed Rousseau’s view on the formation of 
general will. In the second part, Mill’s conception of liberty is analyzed. In the third 
part, I evaluated Kant’s point of view and tried to understand his conceptualization 
of public uses of reason. I attempted to develop basic arguments in every part and 
provide three different concluding remarks. This section helps us to map the idea of 
public reason in Rawls’s theory of constitutional democracy.  
 
3.1. Rousseau on General Will 
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 The conception of general will in democratic theory is at the center of most 
of the political and philosophical debates. Rousseau is perhaps the most important 
thinker in evaluating the conception of general will in a democratic polity. In this 
sense, Rawls seems to have been influenced from Rousseau mostly in his 
considerations for the problems concerning general will formation. (Rawls, 1996: 
xxxix; Rawls, 2001: 4) Political Liberalism is concerned with founding a just 
society through adopting the principles of a representative democratic polity. In 
order to achieve this end, a conception of justice for which everybody is expected to 
endorse is tried to be developed. Public reason is the main idea on the way to 
achieve this end. The connection for Rousseau in Rawls arises at this moment. 
Public reason is an instrument that defines procedural principles on the way to 
general will formation. It is essential to search for the roots of public reason for 
grasping to what extent it is influenced by Rousseau’s conception of general will.  
 In Political Liberalism Rawls is concerned with the principles of equality 
which are associated with republicanism as well as principles of political liberties 
which are associated with liberal democratic ideals.  
… [A] conflict within the tradition of democratic thought itself, between 
the tradition associated with Locke, which gives greater weight to what 
Constant called “the liberties of the moderns”, freedom of thought and 
conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of property, and the rule 
of law, and the tradition associated with Rousseau, which gives greater 
weight to what Constant called “the liberties of the ancients”, the equal 
political liberties and the values of public life. (Rawls, 1996; 5)  
 
The emphasis on other regarding citizens as reasonable citizens, and the moral 
obligations for citizens in deliberative processes are the main republican themes in 
Political Liberalism. Rousseau is also considered as a republican thinker who favors 
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freedom of ancients over the freedom of moderns1. In other words, republican ideals 
such as the moral duty for citizenship is favored over liberal democratic ideals. 
Rousseau as a republican thinker might have strong influence on Rawls in this 
connection. We should ask how far Rawls differentiates from Rousseau’s 
conception of a democratic polity.  
 In the following section, first Rousseau’s conceptions of general will and 
common good are analyzed. His major works of On Social Contract or Principles of 
Social Right (SC) and Discourse on Political Economy (DPE) are taken as the main 
texts for analysis. General will formation as a process is evaluated.  Similarities and 
contrasts between Rousseau and Rawls’s conceptions are presented. In this way, the 
place of public reason in relation to general will formation is understood. Second, 
Rousseau’s conception of citizenship is analyzed. Citizen in a democratic polity with 
moral duties is presented with reference to Rawlsian understanding.  
 
 
3.1.1. General Will and the Common Good 
 
 Perhaps for some it is desirable that man would be in absolute freedom. 
However for Rousseau, it is almost impossible for man to be absolutely free and be 
social at the same time. Rousseau’s noble savage who is not bounded with the 
concerns of social life shows us the conditions for absolute freedom. “Man is born 
free, and everywhere he is in chains.” (SC: 85) What if man would live free and be 
social at the same time in modern society?  
                                                 
1 For more on freedom of ancients and freedom of moderns see Benjamin Constant, 1988 Political 
Writings, (ed.) Biancamara Fontana Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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 A person’s giving up his rights to no one but to the whole community is 
plausible and seems to be the only way of a political society for Rousseau. The 
collectivity of citizens as a sovereign body under equal conditions and the 
supremacy of law comprise a framework for the body politic. Being the sole source 
of legitimacy for the sovereign authority in a republic, individual interests are 
different than the interest of the sovereign as a collectivity of citizens. This point as 
the contradiction among private interests and collective interests is one of the most 
basic problems that Rousseau was dealing with. Formation of the collective will 
versus the particular wills can pertain to the same structure of body politic. Then 
how is this accomplished according to Rousseau? 
 The general will is constituted in accordance with the common good. 
Common good is different from particular wills in every moment so that it might be 
quite contrary to them. The conception of general will presumes a collectivity. It is 
the unanimous nature of general will that makes the collectivity of wills to be ‘the 
general will’. Consequently exclusion of some is harmful to the idea of unanimity in 
this process. General will also indicates that sovereignty which represents this will is 
indivisible. Every citizen is sovereign according to Rousseau for the true realization 
of the general will. Citizens, as the subjects of the body politic, own sovereign 
rights. “Each subject cheerfully obeys laws which he helped enact in his capacity as 
a citizen. He takes the general will for his own will and esteems public opinion.” 
(Cook, 1975: 123) In line with this idea, it is not good for a large body politic be 
formed since the legislative which determines the sovereign general will can easily 
be abused by the sovereign power which could be representative government. 
Rousseau has a specific definition of legitimate body politic for the general will to 
be unanimous. “Populate the territory evenly, extend the same rights everywhere, 
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bring forth abundance and life in every location; in this way, the state will become 
all at once the strongest and best governed possible.” (SC: 142) The unanimity rule 
is essential in the realization of the general will. In this way the general will is 
formed but what the general will is remains to be answered. 
 
 
3.1.1.1. General Will Formation 
 
 General will formation is strictly limited to the understanding that it is 
neither the sum of all wills nor any particular will, including that of the government.  
There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will; 
the latter looks only to the common interest; the former looks to the private 
interest and is only a sum of particular wills, but take away from these same 
wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other out, and the general will 
remains the sum of the differences. (SC: 101)  
 
The source of the general will is the common good and the only authority in this 
decision is the legislator, i.e. citizens, which is different from the executive, of 
government which controls the power. (SC: 118) As a difficult process, general will 
formation requires the unanimity vote at this level as well. The general will in the 
last instance appears in the public. How do the particular wills come to the public 
and how is general will formed? 
 General will is realized after public deliberation. Results of deliberation are 
presupposed to be in favor of the common good.  
If the people, engaged in deliberation, were adequately informed, and if no 
means existed by which the citizens could communicate one with another, 
from the great number of small differences the general will would result, 
and the decisions reached would always be good. (SC, 102)  
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Will of groups in this process however does not result in the will of the whole. Will 
of groups remain as particular wills with respect to the state and the whole. In this 
sense it is crucial that every citizen voices his own argument in the process of 
deliberation. Controlling interest groups in society enables state to single out 
particular wills and helps to realize the general will through evaluating individual 
opinion.  
 
 
3.1.1.2. Public Reason and General Will Formation 
 
 Similar to Rousseau, when Rawls speaks about the state, he is speaking 
about the will of citizens. For Rawls, and in general for liberal theory, citizens relate 
to the state for their equal share of coercive political power, which is inevitable but 
at the same time must be controlled. (Honig, 1993: 100-104; Rawls, 1969: 176-178) 
They exercise this power through voting. Rousseau would share the basic point that 
citizens relate to the state for their equal share in the exercise of legitimate political 
coercion but he would insist on the unanimity of the legislature in this decision. If 
general will appears in the public properly, it would be the basis of this monopoly of 
power because it is the source of sovereignty. The government uses the power and 
depends on the sovereign authority, which is inalienable and is composed of the 
people. “What then is government? An intermediary body established between the 
subjects and the sovereign for their mutual dealings, charged with the execution of 
the laws and with the maintenance of liberty, both civic and political.” (SC: 118) 
Rousseau deals with the idea that general will appears in the public as to define the 
law and regulate almost every aspect of the political life. (Starobinski, 1962: 228-
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232) For Rawls this basis is regulated through the ideal of public reason. 
Consequently, public reason functions like general will. Are they referring to the 
same thing?  
 Public reason is for the decision of the matters of basic justice and 
constitutional essentials. It does not cover all of the political matters unlike general 
will. It is moreover a procedural ideal. (Rawls, 1996: 212-254) In this sense it is 
obvious that public reason and general will are not identical. A similar point in 
Rawls and Rousseau related with the general will and public reason is the point that 
every citizen should speak from his own point and not others’ or with respect to any 
particular will. “It is important, therefore, in order to have a clear enunciation of the 
general will, that there be no partial association in the state and that each citizen 
speak only for himself.” (SC: 101) Particular wills of citizens as well as particular 
wills of associations that citizens might belong to should be excluded from the 
public discussion. Nevertheless, Rawls should not be considered as appealing to 
excluding some sections of the society because exclusion should happen against the 
ones who does not endorse justice as a fair system of cooperation.   
As reasonable and rational, and knowing that they affirm a diversity of 
reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines, they should be ready to 
explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could 
reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their 
freedom and equality. (Rawls; 1996, 218)  
 
The idea of public reason requires a commitment from the citizens of the 
body politic to work properly and it depends on the principle that everyone speaks in 
accordance with his own understanding having in mind others to endorse the same 
ideal. Not every reason is public and not every doctrine is reasonable. Thus citizens 
should leave their commitments to their comprehensive doctrines when bringing 
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anything to the public. The citizens’ reason is not an aggregate reason but it is the 
reason shared by them for living in a society. As reasonable agents, citizens have the 
capacity to consider others for a fair cooperation in the public. Public is the 
collective body of equal citizens. Citizens are free and equal with respect to their 
moral capacities which are the “capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a 
conception of the good.” (Rawls, 1996: 34) However, there is only one public, but 
multiple non-public reasons as such, the idea of public reason should be 
differentiated from the reasons of the parts which are agents in the public. In other 
spheres of social life, namely background culture and nonpublic reasons, the 
freedom of thought and speech, freedom of association and other basic liberties 
allow discursive formations to be displayed by the views of comprehensive 
arguments.  
The category of public is conceptualized after economic reasons in 
Rousseau. The category of public is concerned with the common good.  
The first thing the founder of a republic should do after the establishment of 
laws is to find sufficient assets to support the magistrates and other officers 
and all public expenditures. These resources are called oerarium or fisc, if 
they are in the form of money, or public domain, if they are in the form of 
land, and the latter is far preferable to the former … (DPE: 77)  
 
Rawls’s conception of public does not resemble Rousseau’s understanding in the 
context of democratic thought.2 It is because Rawls is concerned with the priority of 
right whereas for Rousseau common good is prior to any other interest in society.  
 For Rousseau, anything that comes into public should not prescribe opinion 
of a particular group or association. Every individual must speak for himself. Only 
after every citizen deliberates for himself in the public, the differences between 
                                                 
2 For a more elaborate discussion on Rawls’s alternative in democratic theory to Rousseau’s 
conception in terms of egalitarian measures see Weithman, pp. 315-317. 
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people is understood and the will of all comes into the play. (SC: 101-109) Harmony 
of self-interested men living in the society is not desirable for Rousseau. People who 
are seemingly serving the interest of the common good indeed serve for their own 
interests for fame and glory. Thus a genuine ethical conception should suggest an 
ideal through which people are serving the interests of common good not for 
selfishly satisfying personal interests. This is achieved through extending the love of 
self to the love of fellow men.  
In the Social Contract, [Rousseau] describes a community in which genuine 
morality is made possible for all citizens by carefully designed laws and 
mores. In Emile the stress is laid on virtue, an individual achievement made 
possible by independence from society; in the Social Contract, the language 
shifts to that of morality instead, shared patterns of action that rest on 
healthy integration of individuals within society. (Keohane, 1978: 471)  
 
The kind of society that is depicted in the Social Contract enables individuals to 
develop the capacity to love their fellow men.  
Existing societies … mistakenly suppose that we can simply leave men 
alone to pursue their own narrow interests within the framework of a set of 
laws and regulations imposed upon them by a will that is quite alien to their 
own, and then expect men to behave in socially useful and harmonious 
ways. Rousseau’s whole point is that something quiet different, and far 
more drastic, is required. A public must be created to give substance to the 
common interest, and each member of that public must be taught to will his 
own good within that public good. (Keohane, 477)  
 
The general will indicates also the will of the persons each which is thus 
transformed into a public conception. The moral point of view in Rousseau’s 
thought considers general will to bring in a shared ethical conception that transcends 
particular wills. Accordingly, the society is in accord with a genuine ethical 
principle. 
 Rawls’s consideration for limiting the public reason is closely related with 
his aim to avoid any comprehensive doctrine to dominate public and private spheres. 
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Rousseau’s concern is different than this. His concern is arriving at a principle that 
every citizen should respect. Nonetheless, it might not be necessarily in line with the 
particular wills of the citizens. Rawls tries to avoid Rousseau’s kind of general will 
formation since it might bring a comprehensive ideal that shrinks basic rights and 
liberties of the individual. The thin line that Rousseau tries to preserve between 
freedom and democratic sovereignty forces him to found his ideal for a small body 
politic, even at a level of a town or city. Rawls’s concern is contemporary in the 
sense that he has a consideration for large democratic polities comprising millions of 
population living in large territories. His consideration in this sense leads him to 
construct his theory on representative voting as a procedural element which is 
mostly the case for modern democracies. In other words, unlike Rousseau’s 
considerations for extended participation, Rawls focuses on deliberative aspects 
which would contribute to the voting processes. In this sense Rawls considers 
contemporary limits on constitutional democracies. 
 
 
3.1.2. Citizenship 
 
 An important similarity between Rousseau and Rawls arises in the definition 
of citizenship. Both thinkers compelled to drive at an understanding of citizen with 
moral responsibilities. This basic republican tendency is the most explicit element in 
Rawls that takes its roots from Rousseau.  
Whereas public reason with its duty of civility gives a view about voting on 
fundamental questions in some ways reminiscent of Rousseau’s Social 
Contract. He saw voting as ideally expressing our opinion as to which of 
the alternatives best advances the common good. (Rawls, 1996: 220)  
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Voting would enable citizens to understand the general will and to revise 
particularities accordingly. Both for Rousseau and for Rawls, citizens should 
consider others while acting in the public. Other regarding acts that is being 
reasonable for Rawls, is essential for Rousseau, too. Unanimity vote brings 
difference to the will of all which is majority. The marginal difference reflected in 
the will of one against the will of all assures realization of the general will. (SC: 
152) Rawls proposes that unanimity vote is not essential because it is not practical. 
Moreover, public reason supposedly would act like a referee among comprehensive 
worldviews so that no particular will would dominate the government. Public reason 
helps to consolidate general will because first, it depends on the priority of right, 
second it depends on the overlapping consensus. The relation among citizens is 
generally defined through the public conception of justice. Public reason is to 
effectively regulate the conditions in which citizens come together in the public 
forum to decide the principles of basic justice. 
 For Rousseau the state should contribute to the development of individual. 
The institution of state helps individual to flourish his civic abilities. This 
evolutionary view for citizens in Rousseau is somewhat similar to Rawls’s 
evolutionary view. According to Rousseau after a social contract, a state that is 
formed in line with the principles of general will, might contribute to human civic 
abilities and the development of certain virtues. Although state is formed out of a 
necessity to contract, it is possible in time that the state turns into a center for civic 
endowments and a platform for human perfection. 
 
 
3.1.3. Concluding Remarks: Rousseau and Rawls 
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 In the general context of democratic theory, Rousseau’s conception of the 
body politic inspired most of his followers to pursue a specific aim that is the 
realization of a will which is different from any particular wills and the sum of all 
wills. Rawls’s idea of public reason with some of its characteristics can be traced 
back to Rousseau’s original conceptualizations. These are, the things that can be 
brought before the public, moral obligations of the citizenry and the revision of the 
democratic voting principle. However, differences are large to indicate a novelty in 
Rawls’s conceptualization. Rawls brings substantive arguments in Political 
Liberalism that go further from Rousseau’s conceptualization of general will. The 
priority of basic rights and liberties defines the first substantive condition. This 
condition avoids the formation of a general will that is against common good. 
Rousseau does not provide an answer to the problem of how to check the general 
will formation. Deliberation is assumed to provide the best result for the realization 
of the general will. Rawls is rather concerned with the procedure and substance of 
deliberative processes in which the general will is realized.  
 In the democratic theory, the problem to avoid particular wills to become 
general will is assured through the acceptance of individual freedom as prior to 
anything else. Mill’s contribution in his attempt to eliminate tyranny of majority is 
remarkable in this sense. Rawls tends to regard priority of rights and freedoms in 
democratic theory as basic principles. Public reason will be complete to realize the 
general will after the moment that every body accept two basic principles of 
Political Liberalism. Consequently, Rawls goes one step further from Rousseau to 
provide a procedural basis for general will formation. Rousseau provides answers to 
the problem concerning general will formation under the framework of pure 
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republicanism, which is not necessarily liberal. Rawls goes beyond that point by 
applying liberal principles and rights into this pure republican approach. The priority 
of rights and liberties has its reflections in the thoughts of J. S. Mill. Obviously, 
Rawls is influenced from Mill in considering the idea of liberty that is centrally 
important in Rawls’s general theory.  
 
 
3.2. J. S. Mill on Liberty 
 
The idea of the priority of basic rights and liberties in political liberalism is 
directly related to the concept of justice as fairness. This priority is the basic 
principle that the foundation of political liberalism is based upon. It is prior first, to 
every other principle, foremost the second principle of political liberalism, which is 
the difference principle. Second, it is prior to every other human value and 
conceptions of good. This characteristic of political liberalism has its reflection in 
liberal thought which can be traced back to the writings of John Stuart Mill.  
 It is important to lay down Rawls’s consideration for liberty. It is the most 
basic principle in his thought that make up political liberalism to sketch the place of 
liberty, prior to every other good and value. “The priority of liberty implies in 
practice that a basic liberty can be limited or denied solely for the sake of one or 
more other basic liberties, and never, as I have said, for reasons of public good or of 
perfectionist values.” (Rawls; 1996, 295) The concern of Rawls for pointing out this 
principle is the question of how to limit liberty in a liberal polity. This concern as a 
theoretical question was also the concern of John Stuart Mill. What was the research 
question for Mill in 19th century context? 
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 In the following pages, the conception of liberty in Mill’s political 
philosophy is analyzed. First, the priority of liberty is evaluated in Mill’s thought. 
Related to the conception of priority of liberty, second the limits of liberty are 
analyzed. The conception of liberty in Mill’s thought has the intention to promote 
human development. Finally, hierarchy of rights is analyzed in Mill’s understanding 
of liberty. In this part, the regulatory scheme which is meant the practical application 
of basic rights and liberties is evaluated. Then the procedure and the conception of 
individual are analyzed respectively.  
 
 
3.2.1. Priority of Liberty 
 
 In On Liberty, Mill searched for the limits of liberty. In the introductory part 
of On Liberty, he pointed out his aim as to find “the nature and limits of the power 
which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual”. (Mill, 1991: 23) 
He traced the roots of the problem of liberty to the contemporary understanding of 
the concept in his time. “By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the 
political rulers.” (Mill, 1991: 23) In this phrase Mill implicitly refers to Rousseau 
and Locke. In the general framework of liberal thought, Mill’s view on liberty was 
unique in the sense of his approach to consider it as the foremost important concept.  
Society can and does execute its own mandates:  and if it issues wrong 
mandates, instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it 
ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than 
many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by 
such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much 
more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, 
therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs 
protection also against the tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling; 
against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil 
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penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who 
dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the 
formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel 
all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of is own. (Mill, 1991: 
25)  
 
Society finds it rules in relation to individuals. However this sometimes leads to 
unnecessary limitations imposed on individual liberty. Limitations on liberty should 
be paid attention since an important question is at hand in the shaping up of a polity. 
Limitations are needed but there should be a basis of the limitations over individual 
freedom.  
There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with 
individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against 
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as 
protection against political despotism. (Mill, 1991: 26)  
 
How is it then possible to limit liberty at the same time protecting it as prior to 
everything else? 
 Liberty principle avoids any conception of a higher order law or morality to 
impose acts over individuals depending only on particular conceptions of good. It 
prevents authority to decide any conception of good for the citizens under the claim 
for citizens’ own good. In a democratic polity the majority principle might be 
considered to decide the conception of good for individual citizens as well. Mill 
intends to focus on majority rule with reference to liberty. The tendency for the 
tyranny of majority in democratic representative governments should be prevented 
for the realization and protection of individual liberties.  
The priority of liberty of thought and discussion over other rights and goods 
is essential for Mill. Freedom of thought and discussion is a value in itself for Mill 
in the sense that it would enable individuals to develop their human capacities.  
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It still remains to speak one of the principal causes which make diversity of 
opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind should 
have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at 
an incalculable distance. (Mill, 1991: 63)  
 
There is an essential character of Mill’s understanding of basic liberty that is 
founded upon the idea of utility. However it is also debatable for the idea of liberty 
in Mill’s conception to ground it solely on moral basis. His concern for liberty 
should be more than utilitarian. “… Mill’s notion of harm needs to be understood in 
connection with his defense of individuality and self-development.” (Ten, 1991: 
230) Mill’s views on Liberty are different from Bentham’s conception of utility. 
Mill is concerned more on the universalistic conception of liberty. His sole concern 
is obviously not the utility in itself but a more primordial concept. “The observance 
of these rules is necessary in order to preserve peace among human beings. The 
obligations of justice are more stringent than other moral obligations, and they are 
correlated with moral rights.” (Ten, 1991: 231) This interpretation of Mill enables us 
to indicate a shift from a conception of a comprehensive liberal doctrine to a more 
refined view on liberty. Consequently, it is possible to extract Mill’s view on liberty 
as an end in itself.  
 The priority of rights and liberties is advantageous for what it brings to 
human development, morally and intellectually in Mill’s thought. In a similar way 
Rawls’s understanding regarding the priority of rights and liberties contribute to the 
moral powers of citizens. Moreover, Rawls is concerned with the institutional 
scheme that elaborates the application of this priority. The acceptance of priority in 
the list of rights and liberties is basic in the application of them as a general scheme. 
“It is enough that the general form and content of basic liberties can be outlined and 
the grounds of their priority understood. The further specification of the liberties is 
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left to the constitutional, legislative and judicial stages.” (Rawls, 1996: 298) The 
level of decision of what rights and liberties account for basic and some others are 
not left to the principle of moral development. It is suggested that the rights which 
directly contribute to the moral development of citizens that cultivate their two basic 
moral powers are basic rights and liberties. These two basic moral powers are for 
Rawls, the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the 
good. This understanding is in line with the liberal understanding of liberties, as 
directly pointed out in Mill’s text, but a new breadth is proposed by Rawls. Apart 
from right to live, basic rights and liberties, Mill is appealing to the liberty of 
conscience, liberty of thought and feeling, freedom of opinion, liberty of tastes and 
pursuits, freedom to unite3. (Mill, 1991: 31) The point is that Mill also considers 
these rights as contributing to moral development.  
Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to 
know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is 
the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity 
of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. … He who 
chooses his plan [of life] for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use 
observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather 
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, 
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. (Mill, 1991: 74)  
 
 The moral powers that should be cultivated in equal citizens as fully 
cooperating members of the society are related to the first two principles of political 
liberalism as a general scheme. As Rawls comments in a similar fashion:  
These two powers are the capacity for a sense of right and justice (the 
capacity to honor fair terms of cooperation and thus to be reasonable), and 
the capacity for a conception of the good (and thus to be rational). (Rawls; 
1996, 302)  
 
                                                 
3 Freedom to unite is freedom of association. 
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The identification of moral powers that is thought to contribute to the general 
scheme of society is evaluated analytically in Rawls’s conception. The idea of 
human development in Mill’s conception is the contribution of liberty to the 
maturity of human experience. Freedom helps individuality to develop capacities for 
self-recognition and capacities to interpret the world around without appealing to 
any external mandate like religion, customs and so. (Mill, 1991: 72-76) In this sense, 
experience has a central role for the human development. “But it is the privilege and 
proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and 
interpret experience in his own way.” (Mill, 1991: 74) Rawls’s assumption to 
consider human development at two very basic levels as concrete principles and 
Mill’s general observance of human development as equated to individual freedom 
are similar points that should be noted to indicate Rawls’s influence from Mill. 
 
 
3.2.2. Limits of Liberty 
 
 The question of limiting liberty lies in between guaranteeing liberty and the 
necessity of government. The tension between government and liberty is at the core 
of the problem. Regulating an effective government and assuring liberty is the 
prerequisite to guarantee the individual liberty. “… [T]he practical question, where 
to place the limit – how to make the fitting adjustment between individual 
independence and social control – is a subject on which nearly everything remains to 
be done.” (Mill, 1991: 26) In a democratic polity the need to limit the powers of 
government for the sake of individual liberty is important to assure the integrity of 
individual liberties. However, the fact of oppression, mentally or physically might 
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still arise at the expense of individual freedom. According to Mill, the rule of 
majority as such should be prevented from interfering into individual liberty. For 
Rawls also the tyranny of majority needs to be prevented. Constitutional democracy 
is favored by Rawls in the sense that it brings institutional measures to prevent 
tyranny of majority. The rightful procedure to guarantee basic rights and liberties of 
individuals in a democratic scheme is essentially important here. (Rawls, 1996: 421-
424) The first principle of Political Liberalism stresses priority of rights over the 
good with a basic concern to avoid tyranny of majority that is the rule of a particular 
conception of good or comprehensive view over the others in a pluralistic 
constitutional democracy. Mill’s idea in limiting particular conceptions of good at 
the expense of individual liberties seems to be an inspiring arguments on the 
Rawlsian idea of priority of rights. There seems to be a shared concern to avoid 
tyranny of majority in both Mill and Rawls. At first being influenced from 
Rousseau, Rawls develops a republican conception. Second, Rawls applies the 
conception of priority of right, influenced from Mill, to move from Rousseau with a 
specific liberal concern.  
The concern for priority of rights over the good is emphasized in Mill’s On 
Liberty and it also appears in Political Liberalism as a basic liberal precept. “The 
particular meaning of the priority of right is that comprehensive conceptions of the 
good are admissible, or can be pursued in society, only if their pursuit conforms to 
the political conception of justice.” (Rawls, 1996: 176) Citizens should comply with 
the priority of right in society as a fair system of cooperation over the goods for it is 
a required part of a shared public conception of justice. Mill and Rawls share a point 
in assuming the priority of right which prevents any doctrine or worldview to limit 
the individual liberty.  
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Strange that [believers of a particular doctrine] should imagine that they are 
not assuming infallibility when they acknowledge that some particular 
principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned because it is so 
certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain. To call any 
proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if 
permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and 
those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without 
hearing the other side. (Mill, 1991: 41)  
 
Truth claims of any doctrine should be put aside and every opinion should be 
bestowed right to be heard. “In justice as fairness the priority of right means that the 
principles of political justice impose limits on permissible ways of life; and hence 
the claims citizens make to pursue ends that transgress those limits have no weight.” 
(Rawls, 1996: 174) 
 Mill’s obvious argument concerning the limits of liberty is the difficult 
limitation of the idea of liberty. The only condition for limiting one’s liberty is the 
condition that one harms other’s liberty in physical terms. “That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will is to prevent harm to others.” (Mill, 1991: 30) In the 
conceptualization of physical harm, Mill considered utility as the primary principle. 
Harming one means giving that person physical pain which means to incapacitate 
that person from utility. Although argumentation through the principle of harm is 
essentially utilitarian it is important to indicate that protection of liberty is the 
crucial concept. The basic idea in limiting one’s liberty is to ensure the liberty of 
another person. It is important to note that Mill’s appeal to utilitarianism affected his 
line of thought to a great extent. “I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent 
interests of man as a progressive being.” (Mill, 1991: 31) There are two crucial 
points at this instance, the priority of liberty and the realization of a utilitarian ideal. 
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These two are related but distinct at the same time. It is possible then to single out 
the idea of liberty as a prior concept to utility in Mill’s theory. This can be validated 
through Mill’s conceptualization of liberties, in three aspects in a free society; 
liberty of thought and discussion, liberty of tastes and pursuits, freedom to unite4. 
Guaranteeing these liberties at the most basic level contributes to the foundation of a 
free society.  
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, 
whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in 
which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which 
deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so 
long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts 
to obtain it. (Mill, 1991: 33)  
 
 For Mill the liberty of thought and discussion, of the person is the most basic 
liberty that should be respected by the polity and other members of the society. He 
elaborates this ideal by considering the content of ideas and thoughts and their free 
expression. Briefly, the content of any idea and thought that is being expressed in 
society does not jeopardize the idea of freedom. Every individual is free to express 
his ideas and thoughts unconditionally. The limit on this argument arises at the point 
if one harms or intends to harm any other individual. “The threshold is that the 
individual’s conduct harm others or affects prejudicially the interests of others.” 
(Ten, 1991: 215)  
 
 
3.2.3. Hierarchy of Rights 
 
                                                 
4 Originally Mill used the concept as freedom to unite. He means freedom of association in this 
particular matter. 
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The freedom of thought and discussion is one of the basic rights and liberties 
in political liberalism of Rawls too. There is a hierarchy of rights in Rawlsian 
thought.  
Whenever we enlarge the list of basic liberties we risk weakening the 
protection of the most essential ones and recreating within the scheme of 
liberties the indeterminate and unguided balancing problems we had hoped 
to avoid by a suitably circumscribed notion of priority. (Rawls, 1996: 296)  
 
A similar hierarchy is observable in Mill. “The non-essential interests of numerous 
individuals can never outweigh the essential interests in liberty and autonomy of a 
single individual.” (Ten, 1991: 235) The protection of basic rights and liberties is 
meant to provide a basic scheme of social organization in both Rawls and Mill.  
 Other than effective government, Rawls is also concerned with the regulation 
of free deliberative context. This context is provided through constituting basic 
rights and liberties. The constitution of these liberties is not enough for Rawls but 
the regulation of them are required at the same time. “Without the general 
acceptance of reasonable procedures of inquiry and precepts of debate, freedom of 
speech can not serve its purpose.” (Rawls, 1996: 296) These regulations are 
provided through the scheme of political liberalism. The problem at this point is 
prevention of the trespassing of basic rights and liberties by the polity. The general 
scheme of political liberalism that is designed not to interfere every single aspect of 
life but only the political aspects would guarantee the protection of basic rights and 
liberties.  
Political liberalism, then, aims for a political conception of justice as a 
freestanding view. It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological 
doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception itself. As an 
account of political values, a free-standing political conception does not 
deny there being other values apply, say, to the personal, the familial, and 
the associational; … (Rawls, 1996: 10)  
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Through the procedure outlined in line with the political conception of justice no 
one is entitled to accept any other comprehensive doctrine. For Rawls, assuring 
basic rights and liberties is the most basic principle of political liberalism. It is 
similar to Mill’s point that, the guarantee of basic rights and liberties assure the 
existence of free society. According to Mill:  
For laws to be valid and effective, they must be publicly promulgated 
through recognized procedures. This is a requirement of the rule of law. In 
a democracy this publicity requirement extends further, to government 
procedures for making and applying laws. They are to be publicly open; 
also, legislative procedures are to be informed by civic debate and criticism, 
and allow for the airing of grievances. (Freeman, 1992: 13)  
 
The difference principle of justice as fairness indicates the availability of rights to 
the individuals. It states that each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties. This point is one of the basic differences 
between Rawls and Mill. Mill is concerned to find the conditions of the legitimate 
power which can be exercised by society over the individual. However, such liberal 
conception does not deal with the availability of rights to every section of the society 
as Rawls’s conception attempts to do.  
There is another common point which is related to the procedure of 
consolidating rights in the democratic processes. For Mill, the point of procedure is 
important in assuring basic rights and liberties of individuals. However, defining the 
procedure in the democratic processes is left to the experience. “… [I]t is fit to take 
notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions should be permitted, 
on condition that the manner be temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair 
discussion.” (Mill, 1991: 70) The boundaries of free discussion are not fixed but 
depend on the experience. One of the accomplishments of the Rawlsian project is 
improving deliberative conditions in the democratic processes. The idea of public 
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reason defines the process in which this deliberation and fair terms of discussion 
take place. The procedure of public reason can be explained as follows:  
The idea of public reason has a definitive structure, and if one or more of its 
aspects are ignored it can seem implausible, as it does when applied to the 
background culture. It has five different aspects: (1) the fundamental 
political questions to which it applies; (2) the persons to whom it applies 
(government officials and candidates for public office); (3) its content as 
given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice; (4) the 
application of these conceptions in discussions of coercive norms to be 
enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people; and (5) 
citizens’ checking that the principles derived from their conceptions of 
justice satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. (Rawls, 2001: 133)  
 
The experience is a second step in political liberalism. After the conditions of the 
procedure are concretized in the public reason concerning basic matters of justice 
and constitutional essentials, the ongoing procedure is decided through normal 
democratic processes. As Rawls adds:  
 
I have already remarked that the scheme of basic liberties is not specified in 
full detail by considerations available in the original position. It is enough 
that the general form and content of the basic liberties can be outlined and 
the grounds of their priority understood. The further specification of the 
liberties is left to the constitutional, legislative and judicial stages. But in 
outlining this general form and content we must indicate the special role 
and central range of application of the basic liberties sufficiently clearly to 
guide the process of further specification at later stages. (Rawls, 1996: 298)  
 
 
3.2.4. Concluding Remarks: Mill and Rawls 
 
 Political liberalism tries to accomplish a polity which does not rely on any 
comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrine but on a shared conception 
political justice in an overlapping consensus while plurality of conflicting interests 
and worldviews coexists. Several liberal doctrines are said to be proposing a 
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comprehensive doctrine, thus are not compatible with political liberalism. Mill’s 
conception of a liberal society can also be considered under this view, for Rawls. 
“This full autonomy of political life must be distinguished from the ethical values of 
autonomy and individuality, which may apply to the whole of life, both social and 
individual, as expressed by the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill.” 
(Rawls, 1996: 78) The idea of liberty in Rawls does not embrace an idea of 
autonomy of the individual that is founded on a moral basis. It remains at the level 
of conceptualization for a political basis of justice.  
[The value of autonomy] may take two forms: one is political autonomy, 
the legal independence and assured integrity of citizens and their sharing 
equally with others in the exercise of political power; the other is purely 
moral and characterizes ends and ideals, as in Mill’s ideal of individuality. 
(Rawls, 2001: 146)  
 
Thus political liberalism does not engage every aspect of individual autonomy but 
political autonomy.  
This idea of shared political life does not invoke Kant’s idea of autonomy, 
or Mill’s idea of individuality, as moral values belonging to a 
comprehensive doctrine. The appeal is rather to the political value of a 
public life conducted on terms that all citizens can accept as fair. (Rawls, 
1996: 98)  
 
Political liberalism has a substantive aspect for moral obligations but these remain at 
the level of the political and they do not cover all aspects of life. They are primarily 
outlining principles. For instance, these are stated at the very basic level: the two 
principles of justice. “The two principles together, with the first given priority over 
the second, regulate the basic institutions that realize [political] values.” (Rawls, 
1996: 6)  
 Although there is a common differentiating point among political liberalism 
and Mill’s conception of Liberal society and individual there is also a similarity. 
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Rawls, tried to employ the idea of liberty, as it is understood in liberal thought with 
a major concern to avoid instituting a comprehensive doctrine. In this way, he 
proposed to extract the idea of liberty as central to political liberalism but limiting it 
to the realm of political with a concern for equality. For both Mill and Rawls, 
priority of liberty and limits that should be acted upon it are basic for a just and 
political society. They also have a shared understanding in the hierarchy of rights 
and goods as well as the idea of liberty that contributes to personal development. 
Additionally it is important to understand Rawls’s departing points from classical 
liberal conceptualization as in Mill’s. Rawls is more concerned with the regulatory 
scheme that enables the priority of basic rights and liberties for a just and free 
society whereas for Mill, the identification of the procedure to regulate the priority 
of basic rights and liberties against the tyranny of majority is left to the experience 
of the democratic processes. In Mill’s thought, the procedural scheme that is 
consulted by the lawgiver is not defined in strict formal terms. On the contrary, in 
the Rawlsian thought the deliberative mechanism of public reason is a strictly 
defined procedural conception. Consequently, the conceptualization of procedure in 
both thinkers is differentiated. Rawls is against Mill’s conceptualization of 
individual in the sense that it is an attempt to found the idea of individual autonomy 
in a philosophical comprehensive doctrine. For Rawls, citizens should be able to 
choose their own comprehensive doctrines that may not promote individual 
autonomy or individualism since he considers the idea of autonomy only at the level 
of political due to the fact that considering other aspects of life in the context of the 
ideal of autonomy will inevitably bring a comprehensive conception. Rawls attempts 
to escape from a metaphysical doctrine but tries to find a conception of justice to 
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which everybody is expected to endorse without appealing to any metaphysical 
doctrine.  
 
 
3.3. Kantian Roots of the Idea of Public Reason 
 
 The idea of public reason was originally used in the works of Kant. It is then 
crucial to understand the Kantian conception for reaching a general view of the 
concept. Rawls is usually known as a neo-Kantian thinker who seems to be adopting 
Kant’s idea of public reason in his work of Political Liberalism; or modifying it in a 
new breadth; or developing it in a totally different form. (O’Neill, 1997) It is 
necessary to analyze the Kantian understanding of public reason in order to grasp the 
way in which Rawls employs this concept. The idea of public reason is the most 
revised Kantian concept in Rawls’s theory. In general there are two basic Kantian 
principles that guide us in Political Liberalism. These are first, the Kantian 
formulation of formalism that guided Rawls’s equality principle; second, the 
Kantian conception of negativism that guided Rawls’s difference principle. Apart 
from the conceptions of formalism and negativism, the idea of public reason is not 
directly linked to the Kantian philosophy, since the idea of public use of reason is 
the product of Kant’s earlier philosophical principles. For Rawls the idea of public 
reason is one of the foundational principles for Political Liberalism. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to trace the Rawlsian idea of public reason in Kantian philosophy.  
 Kant’s philosophy found its expression in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(CPuR) and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR) in relation to most of his other 
works. Specific development of the idea of public reason is manifested in his essay, 
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What is Enlightenment (WE) and some related features in his work called, Critique 
of Judgment. In order to understand public use of reason in the Kantian thought it is 
necessary to conceive for some basic aspects in his understanding of reason in 
general. Public Reason for Kant is the use of human capacity of reasoning in the 
pursuit of reaching a ground for common agreement in public debates. In the final 
analysis, public uses of reason complete the idea of free individual mind.  
  In the first section of this part, I present the Kantian conception of reason. 
Reason is a mental process for Kant and it is analyzed as an internal process of 
human mind. Then, I evaluate reason as an external process of human mind in 
Kantian conception. The explanation of reason as an external process of mind 
enables us to understand its importance in Kant’s political philosophy. 
Consequently, the concept of authority of reason is presented. Finally in this section, 
the relation of reason as a mental process to public reason and its reflections are 
analyzed. In the second section I attempt to analyze private and public reasons 
respectively. The comparisons between Rawls and Kant concerning their respective 
understandings of private and public reasons are presented. The idea of categorical 
imperative in relation to public uses of reason is analyzed. Then, the idea of 
toleration in relation to public reason is presented. These two ideas provide us with a 
general viewpoint that relates the idea of public reason to Kantian political 
philosophy.  
3.3.1. Reason in Kantian Philosophy   
 
 According to Kant reason should be constructed in an ideal polity to give rise 
to an enlightened society. Reason in itself should not be authorized, but it can be 
authorized for the evolution of an enlightened society. (Kant, WE) Reason is an 
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important starting point to understand the human condition in Kant’s philosophy. 
His two basic works – Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason – 
are dedicated to understand the functioning of human reasoning. The political 
philosophy of Kant is related to reason because only reason provides individuals 
with the capacity to become free. The processes of mind should promise 
emancipating conditions for the political life of humans as well. What are the 
internal processes of mind for the functioning of reason?  
 
 
3.3.1.1. Reason as an Internal Process of Mind 
 
 Reason as the most important capacity of human beings is intrinsically inside 
the human mind. No other external entity, either of religious origin or authority of 
any kind should be interfering into the process of reasoning of one’s mind. The 
inalienability of reason in the mind from outer influences is a general rule labeled as 
‘negative instruction’ (Kant, CPuR). In other words, negative instruction proposes 
the rejection of outer forces that influence reason. The only true way of reasoning is 
possible through the availability of free minds. Rejection of the outer authority on 
mind is required under the framework of disciplining reason. Kant used the term 
dictatorial authority for the authority which undermines the authority of reason from 
outside the reasoning processes of mind. (Kant, CPuR) 
 The freedom of reason is assured if it is left to itself. Reasoning should be 
free from any influences that come from other reasons. In this way, impartial 
judgment of any idea is guaranteed and a kind of identical reasoning is realized 
among the people. The internal processes of human mind should define reason as a 
 71 
free enterprise. The external processes of mind is also important in identifying 
reason.  
 
 
3.3.1.2. Reason as an External Process of Mind  
 
Conditions outside the mind of an individual might not be favorable to 
contribute to free functioning of reason. The political conditions directly influence 
mental processes. The dictates of reason cannot survive in an unenlightened polity 
where other dictates are superior to the self-reasoning. Also the free political 
environment might not be contributing to the mental processes where the plurality of 
reasons stand as dictating over the self-reasoning. After the condition that individual 
mental processes are freed, the political situation needs to be clarified in terms of its 
contribution to the idea of enlightenment. Kant should also be read in a progressive 
way that political enlightenment is not prioritized before the mental enlightenment. 
In a despotic environment people does not have the capacity to develop free 
enterprise in reasoning. (Kant, CPuR) 
 The political conditions should be organized in a way to develop conditions 
in which free reasoning of individuals can be realized. External pressures to 
reasoning should be eliminated. Enlightened political environment promises 
conditions for the development of self-reasoning capacities of individuals. External 
processes of reasoning include communication as an activity in the interpersonal 
realm. Enabling conditions for successful communication is related to the conditions 
of the polity.  
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3.3.1.3. Authority of Reason 
 
 The authority of reason has a central place in Kantian moral philosophy. 
Why was Kant concerned with the authority of reason? Authority as a political 
concept in itself indicates the formulation of moral values in the Kantian thought in 
a political condition. The communication in the public forum identifies the basic 
platform for the public use of reason. 
 The dictatorial authority is more complex than a simple understanding of 
dictating in a simple power relation – most obvious of which is political dictation. 
The dictating authority over reason is the authority of other than one’s self. It may 
include the other’s reasons, ideas and transcendental canons. It may also include the 
environment in which dictatorial tendencies find ground to operate over the 
authority of reason. As O’Neill comments:  
Kant, however, thinks that negative instruction can show us more about the 
discipline of reason. The problem of seeing which modes of thinking – if 
any – are authoritative presupposes not only lack of the ‘dictator’ but also 
the presence of a plurality of non-coordinated (potential) actors or thinkers. 
Kant uses the imagery of ‘citizen’ or ‘fellow workers’ to contrast the 
situation with that of subjects facing a dictator who imposes common 
standards. Kant does not suggest that reason’s authority is based on a 
constitutional convention, but reminds us that there is a plurality of 
potential reasoners. The existing power of transcendent authorities over 
reason cuts through the process of natural functioning of reason. As a result 
there occurs the consolidation of shared beliefs in the society. On the 
contrary, natural functioning of reason should not be interfered. (O’Neill, 
1992b: 65) 
 
Freeing the reason of any dictation of outer impacts is to consolidate the 
authority itself. However, it is paradoxical to refer to the authority of reason or 
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dictate of reason on itself. This paradoxical situation implies that there is no dictate 
of reason over reason. Reason is only freed if it is left to itself.  
… [A] vindication of reasoning might suggest that reasoning issues in 
uncompletable regress, so that prospects of vindicating any claim, including 
claims to identify principles of reason, never terminate: To reason is to keep 
the door open to further questioning. (O’Neill, 1992a: 280-281)  
 
The process of freeing the individual reason will be complete as a mental process. 
The successful set up of political concepts will be assured thereafter. 
The legitimate grounds of debating in the public with a consolidated standing 
authority of reason are not easy to achieve. There is more than one possible ground 
on which authority of reason can be freed from outer pressures in the debate. But all 
of these grounds should assure certain minimum conditions of a legitimate debate. 
These minimum conditions are realized through negative instruction and shared 
principles in public political matters.  
Presumably, there are always many views by which a plurality of non-
coordinated parties can communicate or interact. All of these ways, 
however, must meet at least the negative condition that are not based on 
strategies of thought or action that are in principle unshareable. (O’Neill, 
1992b: 74)  
 
Shared principles among the parties and negative instruction are prior to public 
debate within the framework of the authority of reason.  
 
3.3.1.4. Reason in General 
 
An important aspect of reason is that it is non-aligned and non-procedural in 
its processes. The idea in free enterprise of reasoning does not entail mathematical 
and algorithmic reasoning in methodology. On the contrary, sporadic argumentation 
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through non-aligned mind processes indicates free reasoning without interference. 
The environment in which reasoners act suggests a plurality in which it allows free 
reasoning. “Critique of reason is possible only if we can find a strategy by which a 
plurality of potential reasoners interact without relying on force, or on the fiction of 
pre-established harmony.” (O’Neill, 1992b: 67) The unpremeditated mind processes 
of reasoning are an assurance of freedom in the public use of reason.  
An account of human knowledge will be systematically indeterminate 
unless these maxims are identified and vindicated. Here we begin to see 
why Kant thinks that practical reason is fundamental to all reasoning. Why 
there can be no complete rules for judging and why human reasoning is, as 
we might say, non-algorithmic, down to the bottom. (O’Neill, 1992b: 68)  
 
The free flow of arguments in the reasoning process is to allow the freedom for 
reason. 
This is problematic because when there is a multiplicity of different and 
contending ideas and views in a society, it becomes difficult to realize freedom in 
reasoning. As a solution, freedom of the mind in reasoning should be guaranteed. 
Freedom of mind in reasoning is realized through the toleration of reasons in a 
condition of plurality of reasoners. The condition of providing freedom to the mind 
for reasoning is called console in reasoning. Console in reasoning as a cognitive 
process is closely connected to the political situation. Console in reasoning allows 
individuals to reason freely in a world for plurality of reasons.  
Toleration of public uses of reason is on this account necessary for the 
emergence and maintenance of the increasingly generally shared standards 
of reasoning which public communication requires fully. Practices of 
intelligence may damage the partial standards of reason on which restricted 
communication also depends. (O’Neill, 1986: 534)  
 
The political and social environment would be including the plurality of many views 
of reasoning in the publicly shared forum. Kant’s concern is to validate the situation 
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in which people freely exercise their reasoning for the successful realization of an 
enlightened situation.  
The Rawlsian understanding of reason also presupposes a mental process in 
the development of political conditions. Rawls is concerned with the reasoners as 
much as the reason in the minds of individuals. Reasoners are regarded in similar 
conditions in terms of the ground on which public reason operates. Rawls has a 
similar thought to Kant in the analysis of the conditions of reasoners as the potential 
individuals on an equal basis. The individual should be ignorant of transcendental 
dictates over his reason for Kant. In the Rawlsian approach, the original position is 
an instrument in the process of abolishing external dictates to reasoning. According 
to the idea of original position, individuals choose the principles of justice without 
knowing their social and natural status in the society.5 Nevertheless, in Rawls’s 
thought everybody is free in appealing to any transcendental idea or doctrine, known 
as comprehensive doctrines. The individual could be the contributor in the public 
forum as long as he abides with the general precepts of the principles of justice. The 
transcendental thought that might dominate one’s reason should not be against the 
idea of public reason and the principles of political liberalism. 
 
3.3.2. Public and Private Reason 
 
 Differences between the public and private reasons are explained by Kant in 
“What is Enlightenment”. It is important to understand private reason for the fact 
                                                 
5 The idea of original position is dealt in detail in connection with the Kantian categorical imperative 
in the coming pages. 
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that it provides insights for us to understand Kantian conception of public uses of 
reason and common grounds in which the plurality of reasoners communicate.  
 
 
3.3.2.1. Private Uses of Reason 
 
The kind of reason that is exercised in the chain of command is regarded as 
the private reasoning. “The use, therefore, which an appointed teacher makes of his 
reason before his congregation is merely private, because he carriers out the orders 
of another.” (Kant, WE: 6) Unlike public uses of reason, private uses of reason are 
unfavorable for the sake of free polity. “The point is that they are deprived 
(privatus), incomplete uses of reason. In all such communication there is a tacit, 
uncriticized and unjustified promise of submission to the ‘authority’ that power of 
office establishes.” (O’Neill, 1992b: 66) The discipline of reasoning includes 
effective use of private reasoning for the good of the community as well as the use 
of public reasoning for the sake of free enterprise of the polity.  
Many affairs which are conducted in the interest of the community require 
a certain mechanism through which some members of the community must 
passively conduct themselves with an artificial unanimity, so that the 
government may direct them to public ends, or at least prevent them from 
destroying those ends. (Kant, WE: 5)  
 
The discipline as the self restraint of reason cannot be clearly identified in its 
wording but be left as it is. It is thus concluded that reason is restricted by one’s 
reason itself. This is the idea of autonomy as freedom.  
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3.3.2.2. Public Uses of Reason 
 
 The core of Kant’s philosophy lies in defining the problem of human 
freedom. An ideal polity should provide conditions for the development of free 
reasoning individuals. Public reason is the important step in assuring this ideal. 
Public Reason in Kantian philosophy is the use of human capacity of reasoning in 
the pursuit of reaching a ground for common agreement in public debates, where a 
plurality of reasons belonging to different views and ideas exist.  
The public use of reason is free in terms of public. Communication before 
the public requires a certain level of freedom from other pressures into the ground of 
communication. Kant’s definition of the public is dependent on his definition of the 
private. The private is valid for officers of a post under the establishment of state or 
other institution as such.  
In speaking of the communications of officials as private, he is not 
suggesting that these acts express the personal or individual opinions but 
pointing out that they address not ‘the world at large’ but an audience 
which has been restricted and defined by some authority. (O’Neill, 1986: 
530)  
 
Public is then defined as the outer world at large and not limited to the institutional 
structure of any authority. The general criterion for this is the character of 
communication in terms of publicity. The matter in question could be publicizable 
(O’Neill, 1986) or not which in turn defines its condition as public or private.  
Public use of reason is not the usage of reason for the argumentative 
proceedings in a public debate. Reasoning for the sake of argumentation is not truly 
a public use of reason. In such an instance the reason is used to dictate any other 
argument over the process of free reasoning. The authority of reason would not be 
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the ‘authority’ but the use of any other dictate in a higher authority. This kind of 
reasoning should be excluded from the public debate.  
The construction of knowledge should not be directed or planned but would 
be available through the existence of the plurality of reasoners sharing a basis which 
is not strictly outlined. “This is why the basic task of constructing principles of 
political order, and why politics provide metaphors for articulating the task, 
principles and limits of reason.” (O’Neill, 1992b: 70) Kant takes the political 
proceduralism of a free polity as a model for the general inquiry of reason. Practical 
reason itself is a free enterprise in the construction of knowledge. The reasoning of 
agents on the basis of non-aligned free debates is on the one hand for the possibility 
of human knowledge and on the other for the consolidation of the authority of 
reason. 
 As the level of institutionalization in society increases, the omni-potence of 
private reasons becomes more restricting. The polity as such would be organized in 
a way that would allow the flourishing of freely consolidated public reasons. The 
realization of despotic uses of power put the private uses of reason under custody as 
well. Kant is skeptical about the private uses of reason at the expense of public 
reasons. Nevertheless, Kant has a positive attitude in most of his works that he sees 
the maturing of free reasoning even in worst conditions. The actual working of 
public use of reason contributes to the evolution of the polity towards the maturity of 
enlightenment. “Failure to tolerate public and incipiently public uses of reason 
undercuts all possibility of development of standards of debate and of moves in the 
direction of a just polity.” (O’Neill, 1986: 547) 
Unlike Kant, Rawls considers the realization of public reason only in a 
democratic polity. Kant is always positive in the existence of public reasoning in 
 79 
even most primitive polities to a certain level which will allow the reasoners into a 
more evolved political condition. As O’Neill comments:  
In pre-political and despotic societies there can perhaps be no more than 
variants of the non-public reason … By contrast, the vindication of Kant’s 
account of public reason lies in the thought that reasons must be 
exchangeable among reasoners, hence that any reasons that are relevant for 
all cannot presuppose the contingencies of a particular social or political 
formation. (O’Neill, 1997; 426)  
 
 
 
3.3.3. Categorical Imperative and Public Reason 
 
In line with Rousseau’s arguments Kant proceeds with a more elaborate 
conception for finding a regulative framework for a genuine ethical principle in 
society. “… In Social Contract Rousseau had made liberty depend on self-
legislation. Kant extended Rousseau’s idea by making morality depend on 
obedience to universally applicable self-imposed rules.” (Ritter & Bondanella, 1988: 
207) Kant’s starting point is moral man whereas Rousseau’s starting point is natural 
man. In this sense, Kant tries to construct a moral commitment device. This device 
might be the categorical imperative which guides the individual to act in accordance 
with a universal moral principle. Categorical imperative is the general moral law in 
Kant’s philosophy. It tries to define an objective principle of morality. It commands 
that a person should act so as to regard himself and others as human beings in equal 
conditions. Rawls proceeds with the Kantian conception of constructing a universal 
regulative ideal but with a specific concern to avoid substantive claims. Thus Rawls 
proceeds further from Rousseau by developing the idea of original position to help 
public reason to operate in a way that contributes to general will formation. 
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According to the idea of original position, persons decide to choose the principles of 
justice without knowing their social and natural status in the society. Through the 
principle of original position Rawls aims at developing a society in which no one 
becomes advantaged or disadvantaged by chance.  
 Categorical imperative is the general moral law in Kant’s philosophy. It tries 
to define an objective principle of morality. According to categorical imperative a 
person should act as he wills through an accepted universal principle. Man acts as he 
wills to the extent he considers others to act in the same way. He should consider 
others as ends in themselves as human beings, not as means to other wills. 
Categorical imperative is in accord with the principle of formality. It is formal in the 
sense that it provides general rules of a procedural conception. (Reiss, 1991: 16-21) 
This is the second formulation of categorical imperative.  
The centrality of categorical imperative in Kantian thought also provides 
basic precepts for his understanding of reason. The categorical imperative is 
interfered only by the construction of authority of reason. The agents will not be 
exposed to any outer authority with the successful adoption of categorical 
imperative including the negative instruction.  
The categorical imperative is only a strategy for avoiding ways of thinking, 
communicating and acting which cannot be adopted by all members of a 
plurality whose principles of interaction, are not established by any 
transcendent reality. (O’Neill, 1992b: 74-75)  
 
Categorical imperative sets out the limits on reasoning as an inner capacity of 
humans. As though the complete algorithm of reasoning is not laid out, the limits of 
it should be set in classical line of thought. Categorical imperative is here to provide 
the basic limit on free reasoning in debate. “The categorical imperative, applied to 
reasoning itself, demands that we reason on principles that others can (not will or 
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would) act on.” (O’Neill, 1992b: 76) The categorical imperative imposes a kind of 
regulative principle on the limits of reasoning. Accordingly, the debaters in a forum 
should be reasoning under this precept. There is also the hypothetical imperative 
which is different from categorical imperative. According to Kant, hypothetical 
imperative functions when there is a certain aim in an action. Thus hypothetical 
imperative is more about private uses of reason. On the contrary, categorical 
imperative is related to the public uses of reason. The reasoners in the public should 
not follow the line of hypothetical imperative but should apply the categorical 
imperative. (Kant, 1964) The limits on public use of reason presumes the exclusion 
of hypothetical imperative in the public.  
Kantian public reason does not have an understanding of limit, which is 
prescribed through the use of the categorical imperative as a moral precept. Rawls 
uses a similar idea in limiting the idea of public reason. It is possible to trace 
categorical imperative in Rawls’s writings, related with the concern for limiting. “… 
[E]ach of us must have and be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles and 
guidelines we think other citizens (who are also free and equal) may reasonably be 
expected to endorse along with us.” (Rawls, 1996: 226) Other than this implicit 
reference categorical imperative is reflected in Rawls’s theory through the idea of 
original position. Indirectly, Kantian formalism is adopted in Rawls’s political 
liberalism as a moral precept. The idea of public reason in Rawls’s thought provides 
a formal procedural conception for reasoning in the public. The universal principle 
for Public Reason is developed through original position in Rawls. Categorical 
imperative is not directly reflected in public reason but it is revised in the idea of 
original position. Persons decide to choose the principles of justice without knowing 
their social and natural status in the society. This condition of not knowing essential 
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personal features is called the veil of ignorance. Through the principle of original 
position Rawls aims at developing a society in which no one becomes advantaged or 
disadvantaged by chance. Consequently, the principles of justice they are going to 
decide do not favor any particular group or person in the society. Original position is 
an attempt to develop a formal mental procedure for an objective universality claim 
for morality. In this sense, the connection provided by original position indicates an 
indirect link for public reason with the Categorical imperative. (Bohman, 1996: 4-
21) 
 
 
3.3.4. Concluding Remarks: Kant and Rawls 
 
The public use of reason is an attempt by Kant to ground the idea of 
toleration in the universal conditionality. It is deeply rooted in the evaluation of the 
idea of reason more than its being an idea of toleration distinctively. “It is the 
freedom to make public use one’s reason as every point.” (Kant, WE: 4-5) As a 
distinct entity in its own, at first it is worth to clarify the idea of toleration in its 
relation to public reason. Toleration is of consideration where there is a need for 
agreement and communication. Understanding one’s point is already interfering 
with the idea of that person, consequently non-interference to any kind of 
communication is not possible. “We are not ourselves asserting that ground of 
toleration but offering it as one they could assert consistent with their 
comprehensive doctrines.” (Rawls, 2001: 152) Rawls continued after Kant in his 
understanding of toleration. Toleration is as wide as the reasonable limits are set. 
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An important aspect of Rawls’s idea of public reason is limiting it around the 
political standing of individuals as citizens in a just polity. Kant does not consider 
this but is concerned with the values at large. Being human is the basic precept to 
provide grounds for a moral principle in Kantian philosophy. Reason is not 
restricted in the public with reference to reasoners. They do not need to share any 
commonality, such as citizenship.  
Reasons are given and received, exchanged and rebutted: unrestricted 
reasons can be given and received, exchanged and rebutted unrestrictedly, 
even among those who are not citizens of the same democratic polity who 
do not share the same political identity. (O’Neill, 1997: 423)  
 
Rawls, in contrast limited the account of reasoners in the public to the very basic 
principle of citizenship in a prior assumption. The political relationship of persons’ 
is “a relationship of persons within the basic structure of society into which they’re 
born and in which they normally lead a complete life.” (Rawls, 1996: 216) This gap 
in the definitive principles of public reason is a crucial differentiation of Rawls from 
the Kantian line of thought.  
The important point to mention is that Rawls’s conception follows a similar 
line of thought like that of Kant’s in the establishment of principles. They are both 
concerned with finding a basic regulating idea for the agents in a public forum that 
are actively participating in the reasoning process. Indeed Kant has a concern to 
regulate the relations between the state and people in an enlightened state of affairs. 
Rawls’s intention also lies in the idea of renewing and developing the idea of public 
reason under a framework of public political conception of justice. Rawls indicates 
that Kantian conception is formulated as a comprehensive principle. “… Kant’s 
doctrine is a comprehensive view in which the ideal of autonomy has a regulative 
role for all of life.” (Rawls, 1996: 9) On the contrary, Rawls attempts to find a 
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conception which is political – not metaphysical – and at a distance from any 
comprehensive worldview. As he himself makes the point concerning such 
difference:  
This idea of a shared political life does not invoke Kant’s idea of autonomy, 
or Mill’s idea of individuality, as moral values belonging to a 
comprehensive doctrine. The appeal is rather to the political value of a 
public life conducted on terms that all reasonable citizens can accept as fair. 
This leads to the ideal of democratic citizens settling their fundamental 
differences in accordance with an idea of public reason. (Rawls, 1996: 98)  
 
The basic difference arises in the motivation of Kant who tries to develop a moral 
philosophy and the motivation of Rawls who tries to found a ground for a political 
project suitable for pluralistic democratic societies.  
Political liberalism is an attempt to achieve the foundations of a well-ordered 
society. As a result it is only concerned with the political aspects of life so that it 
will not be a comprehensive worldview or a comprehensive doctrine. Kant’s idea of 
public reason comprises a comprehensive view of universalism. Rawls limited the 
idea of universalism for the sake of finding a public political conception of justice in 
Political Liberalism. These limits are realized in considering the political society in 
which the idea of justice as fairness stands. First, Rawls focused on the political 
aspects of society, not on the background culture. Second Rawls considered the 
society as a closed entity so that the idea of a well-ordered society is plausible and a 
reasonable public conception of justice can be realized.  
To say that a society is well-ordered conveys three things: first … it is a 
society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, 
the very same principles of justice; and second, … its basic structure is 
publicly known, or with good reasons believed, to satisfy these principles. 
And third, its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they 
generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which they regard as 
just. (Rawls, 1996: 35)  
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Third, citizens are considered to lead a life in such a closed society so that they 
honor the limits of public reason. “[Public reason] is a relationship of persons within 
the basic structure of the society into which they are born and in which they 
normally lead a complete life.” (Rawls, 1996: 216)  
 In this chapter I attempted to evaluate the views of Rousseau, Mill and Kant 
with respect to Rawlsian idea of public reason and its theoretical foundations. Rawls 
as a proponent of deliberative democracy emphasizes the concept of public reason. 
As I have demonstrated Rousseau, Kant and Mill have been influential on Rawls to 
a great extent. From Rousseau Rawls takes the understanding of a general will that 
can be realized through the functioning of public reason and the ideal of citizenship 
with moral obligations. However, he leaves substantive arguments and Rousseau’s 
desire to consolidate common good and general will above all other interests behind. 
From Mill Rawls takes the idea of priority of right and concerns to limit the tyranny 
of majority but leaves utilitarian conceptions of individual and Mill’s idea of 
individual autonomy behind. From Kant Rawls takes the conception of public use of 
reason and a form of categorical imperative although he revised it a lot. Likewise, 
another contemporary philosopher, Jürgen Habermas engages in developing a 
similar conception which led to a debate on public reason between Rawls and 
Habermas. Thus it is important to evaluate and compare Habermas’s view with that 
of Rawls’s to comprehend scope of this crucial debate.  
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CHAPTER IV 
HABERMAS ON PUBLIC USE OF REASON 
 
 
 Habermas is the most influential political theorist of the 20th century in terms 
of his contributions to democracy debate. Habermas presents the most obvious 
alternative to Rawls’s position in deliberative democracy. (Baynes, 1992) In the 
debate for public reason it is essential to understand Habermas’s position since it 
provides a different approach for the justification of deliberative processes. 
Habermas is one of the recent theorists who revise Kantian conception of public 
uses of reason alongside with Rawls. He tries to develop public reason in a more 
dynamic way – that revises itself constantly – when compared to Rawlsian 
conceptualization. (Bohman, 1995) In this part I will attempt to clarify Habermas’s 
position in deliberative democracy and his conceptualization in terms of public uses 
of reason. In this way, the theoretical position of Habermas would be clarified before 
I present and discuss their debate in the next chapter. 
 In order to understand the propositions concerning Habermas’s insights on 
public uses of reason in a comparative perspective with Rawls’s public reason, it is 
important to evaluate Habermas’s major concepts and his position in social and 
political theory. In the first section Habermas’s social and political theory is 
presented briefly. His intention in developing a complete social theory is analyzed. 
His problems and concerns for modern society are evaluated. First his 
 87 
epistemological point of view is presented concerning modern society and his 
propositions for communicative action are analyzed. In line with his position, for a 
theory of communicative action, Habermas’s conception for discourse ethics opens 
up the way for a new theory of deliberative politics and legal theory. In the second 
section, his conception of discourse ethics and discourse principle is analyzed in 
detail. Discourse ethics will indicate the conditions of a procedure for the public 
uses of reason. In the third section, the connections of the discourse ethics as a 
procedure with the conceptions of legal and democratic system are presented. This 
section evaluates the conditions for legitimacy and Habermas’s propositions for the 
validity and justification of norms. Consequently, the procedure of the democratic 
system is completed after this second moment. Section part is about Habermas’s 
conceptualization of public sphere. Understanding public sphere is important for the 
reason that the limits and constraints of the procedural system of discourse ethics 
and the legal order are observed in the public space. In the fifth section deliberation 
through discourse principle is evaluated. This section intends to give a more 
comprehensive and concrete outlook to the general argument for the public uses of 
reason in Habermas’s theory. In the final section, conclusive remarks are given and a 
brief summary is provided.  
 
 
4.1. Purposive Rationality versus Communicative Rationality 
 
 Habermas is concerned with the evolution of modern societies. The 
scientism in modern society led to the dominance of instrumental rationality in 
almost every aspect of life. Scientism defines the reflection of society from the view 
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of knowledge that is produced through empirical sciences. According to Outhwaite 
scientism is: “the reduction of all knowledge to that furnished by the empirical 
sciences, where these are conceived as an unproblematic reflection of reality.” 
(Outhwaite, 1994: 20) Science and technology in modern life became instruments to 
assure the application of practical methods to effectively regulate industrial, 
administrative and political processes in an interwoven process. Practical rationality 
means the application of only purposive-rational6 actions of empirically assured 
scientific methods. Government, institutions employ scientifically assured 
techniques for specific purposes, which resembles to purposive-rational action. The 
process of the domination of instrumental rationality is explained in terms of the 
relationship between theory and practice.  
Any theory that relates to practice other than by extending and rationalizing 
our control over natural and social processes stands convicted of ideology. 
The social potential of theory is reduced to the power of technical control. 
Its potential for enlightened action, in the historical meaning of the term, 
disappears. (McCarthy, 1989: 7)  
 
In general, the process, for which the scientific rationality and purposive-rational 
action prevails, is called the scientization. Habermas’s insights concerning 
scientization of modern society would lead to the conceptualization of 
‘communicative action’ as an alternative to purposive-rational and instrumental 
action.  
 Purposive-rational action is understood as action that is directed to certain 
goals or efficiency. It is sought generally in the modern theories of Weber, Marx and 
Parsons. Instrumental action ignores the mutual understanding of individuals. The 
dimension of agreement is disregarded in modern theories of purposive-rational 
                                                 
6 For more on purposive rationality and purposive-rational action in relation to scientization see 
Habermas: “Theory and Practice” and Habermas: “Technology and Science as Ideology”. 
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action. On the contrary, the action that takes communication into account would 
remedy the particular problems of mutual understanding and agreement in modern 
society. Communicative action is oriented towards the interpersonal context. 
Communication indicates a level of interaction and agreement among individuals. 
Social interaction is realized through communication and a consensus is sought for 
the general functioning of society. (Seidman, 1989)  
The emphasis on interaction will be clearer when the types of rational action 
are understood. According to Habermas, action for success and action for 
understanding is two different categories of rational action. Action for success 
unavoidably aims at influencing other individuals’ behavior. Strategic action is the 
one which aims at influencing others’ actions. On the contrary, action for 
understanding requires a certain level of interaction among counterparts. 
Communicative action enables individuals to employ their rational action at the 
same time understanding general conditions of others through interaction. According 
to Habermas, communication inherently aims at understanding. (Johnson, 1991: 
191-194)  
At the level of political processes, the domination of strategic action 
indicates itself through scientization of politics. The rise of technocratic models in 
the modern society constituted the dominance of technical rationality in politics. The 
decisions are not taken through public discussion but through technocratic means. 
The legitimacy of democratic processes is assured through periodic elections. 
However there is a problem for democratic legitimacy itself:  
Political decisions themselves remain beyond the authority of rational 
discussion in the public sphere; decision making power can be legitimized 
but not rationalized. … The reduction of political power to rational 
administration – that is, administration guided by theoretical insight into 
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what is objectively necessary (for stability, adaptability, growth and so 
forth)– deprives the public sphere of any function … (McCarthy, 1989: 11)  
 
This paradox for the democratic legitimacy is the essence of legitimation crisis. 
Although it is not necessary to go into details of legitimation crisis, it is important to 
note that instrumental action leads to a paradox in which social interaction among 
citizens is avoided. Yet, the source of legitimacy is embedded in social interaction 
that is by-passed by technocratic decision-making. Communicative action would 
bring insights to overcome a legitimation crisis through increasing the potential of 
social interaction in the public sphere7.  
The serious problem concerning purposive-rational action is its 
overwhelming extension to all other spheres of modern life. The power of social 
interaction is the emancipatory power that would enable purposive-rational action to 
leave other spheres of life and remain in the sub-sphere of production where it 
originally belongs. Communicative action is the rational action that opens 
possibilities for free social interaction. In communicative action consensus 
dominates the scene. Interaction aims at consensual understanding. (McCarthy, 
1989) 
For the questions of good life and ethical concerns, Habermas turned to 
Kantian conceptualization of ethical precepts and revised Kantian ethics in his own 
way through application of communicative action. A universal moral concept that is 
valid for everyone is tried to be developed by Habermas in ‘discourse ethics’ in a 
similar fashion to what Kant developed in categorical imperative.  
 
                                                 
7 Public sphere is used to indicate domain of social life where public opinion is formed. (Seidman, 
1989: 231) 
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An important part of this project has been the development of what he 
(together with Karl-Otto Apel) calls ‘discourse’ or ‘communicative ethics’ 
in which Kant’s categorical imperative is reformulated in terms of a 
discursive procedure for moral argumentation. (Baynes, 1992: 77)  
 
The basis formed by discourse ethics would provide a general ground for the public 
uses of reason. Discourse ethics defines the conditions in which citizens of a 
democratic society can participate in the decision making process. It elaborates the 
procedural conditions of inclusion to the public discourse. For a comparative 
analysis of Habermas’s conception for the public uses of reason and Rawlsian public 
reason, understanding discourse ethics and its foundational strengths is essential. Let 
me now focus on what Habermas means by discourse ethics.  
 
 
4.2. Discourse Ethics 
 
 Discourse principle (D) states that: “Only those norms of action are valid to 
which all possibly affected persons could assent as participant in rational 
discourses.” (Habermas, 1994: 459) For discourse principle to be in effect discourse 
ethics is developed as a basic regulative framework for democratic legitimacy. 
Discourse ethics tries to reach a discourse principle in its application to normal life 
conditions and its relation to free will of the individuals. It does not provide a 
substantive definition of a moral conception, but lays down rules of the game for a 
procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy. Discourse ethics is based on the 
claim for moral validity in complicated social systems. “The central principle is that 
for a norm to be valid, its consequences for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests 
must be acceptable to all as participants in a practical discourse.” (McCarthy, 1991: 
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viii) For Habermas consideration for the ethical basis is realized at the level of a 
practical discourse of a community rather than at the level of moral consciousness 
which is the case for Kant. Discourse ethics in the final analysis tries to develop a 
procedure for moral agreement, rather than a moral law.  
 Discourse ethics is the basic solution to relations between persons and 
Habermas proposes that moves from subjective realm to intersubjective realm for 
moral validity claims. The principle of discourse ethics is a principle that calls for 
the validity of its procedure. “Only these norms can claim to be valid that meet (or 
could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a 
practical discourse.” (Habermas, 1991: 66) The definition of discourse ethics finds 
its grounds in an attempt to formulate a rational procedure for social discourse.  
Anyone who seriously engages in argumentation must presuppose that the 
context of discussion guarantees in principle freedom of access, equal rights 
to participate, truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in 
adopting positions, and so on. If the participants genuinely want to 
convince one another, they must make the pragmatic assumption that they 
allow their ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses to be influenced solely by the force of 
the better argument. (Habermas, 1993: 31)  
 
The justification of moral norms would be guaranteed by the procedure that 
regulates intersubjective realm. Consequently, truth claims would be void in the 
formulation of the ethical principles. Justification assumes the priority of the force 
of the better argument. Every norm must comply with the rule of universalization 
which is abbreviated as (U):  
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s 
interests (and those consequences are preferred to those of known 
alternative possibilities for regulation). (Habermas, 1991: 65)  
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In this way universalization of the moral norm would be realized as it is justified in 
the intersubjective realm.  
 The kind of universalization Habermas proposes aims at developing validity 
claims that are taking normative rightness rather than truth claims into consideration. 
In this sense every kind of speech act is included to be considered in the range of 
validity claims. The validity of a norm is tested through communicative rationality, 
not in terms of the validity claim of its truthfulness. The norm in question should 
enter into discourse and its validity is decided through the force of the better 
argument.8 (Baynes, 1992: 77-82)  
 In discourse ethics, justification of norms is based on the notion of 
agreement among individuals, which is achieved by discussing. Justification goes 
beyond personal realm to interpersonal realm. Participants in the discursive 
condition consider others in equal respect with a reciprocally assured mutual 
agreement. Individuals take other viewpoints into consideration in the social 
discourse. In the intersubjective realm every individual is left to his own moral 
viewpoint. The mutual agreement of individuals indicates mutual respect for 
different moral viewpoints at the same time. Autonomy of individuals is assured in 
the complexity of discursive interaction. (McCarthy, 1990) 
The conditions in which religious and metaphysical moral claims flourish are 
tried to be described so that oncoming context might be revealed and the moral norm 
would be applied accordingly. Discourse ethics is applicable in all circumstances 
because it does not depend on the context but it considers the interpersonal social 
                                                 
8 The argument here belongs to Baynes which seems plausible in interpreting Habermas. However it 
should be noted that there are different interpretations of Habermas’s position. Truth claims are 
different but moral rightness is still tested on cognitive grounds for Habermas. Habermas is a moral 
cogntivist which makes his interpretations different from Rawls’s position. I am grateful to Cem 
Deveci for his insightful comments on this issue.  
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relationships. It is at first not metaphysical since the contexts are not defined strictly 
and at the same it is justly arranged since the conditions of discourse are defined 
properly. This aspect of the discourse ethics indicates its moral consideration.  
In my view, the discourse principle must be situated at a level of abstraction 
that is still neutral vis-à-vis the distinction between morality and law. On 
the one hand, it is supposed to have a normative content sufficient for the 
impartial assessment of norms of action as such; on the other hand, it must 
not coincide with the moral principle, because it is only subsequently 
differentiated as the moral principle and the democratic principle. 
(Habermas, 1994: 459)  
 
Discourse ethics in this sense provides an ethical principle for mutual understanding 
in complex social relationships without proposing metaphysical constraints. Only, 
communicative rationality itself defines its limits and horizons.  
In exactly or partially based ethical norm systems the deficiency of 
depending on moral precepts indicate themselves through certain conditions. 
Defined immoral actions require defined moral reactions. “The normative sentences 
in which these obligations are expressed point to a background of normatively 
generalized behavioral expectations.” (Habermas, 1993: 41) The kinds of arguments 
that define normative precepts of moral norms on specific occasions are inevitable in 
metaphysically based moral norm systems. In discourse ethics the validity of moral 
norm does not consider any action or reaction to it, in specific terms. On the 
contrary, it is the procedure of a not strictly defined social condition.  
 Moral validity is realized in an intersubjective formulation. All of the 
members of society have a role in interpreting the validity of norms and ethical 
practices. Validity claims depending on personal insight and egoistic interpretations 
unavoidably concern a moment of coercion, a coercion of argumentation for the 
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validity claim. The difference between the validity for one and the validity for all is 
the specific point in Habermas’s conceptualization.  
Every justified truth claim advocated by someone must be capable of being 
defended with reasons against the objections of possible opponents and 
must ultimately be able to command the rationally motivated agreement of 
the community of interpreters as a whole. (Habermas, 1993: 53)  
 
Interpretation requires communicative community and communicative action. 
Discourse ethics aims at the ultimate realization of communicative community.  
 Discourse principle depends on the assumption that individuals use their 
liberties in the pursuit of democratic reason, although not defined properly to avoid 
substantive claims. The more concrete requirement is the condition that individuals 
would not use their communicative liberties for personal pursuits.  
Despite this structure, however, they can open up the sources of 
legitimation in discursive opinion – and will – formation only if citizens do 
not exclusively use their communicative liberties like individual liberties in 
the pursuit of individual interests, but rather use them as communicative 
liberties for the purpose of a ‘public use of reason’  (Habermas, 1994: 461)  
 
The modern legal community needs a kind of citizenship that desires the sources of 
freedom so that it would ensure the level participation at desired levels. The more 
the members of the community assure their allegiance to the system as participators 
and lawmakers the more the system would function legitimately.  
 It is also important to locate discourse ethics in terms of moral theory. In the 
end the position proposed by the discourse ethics will reveal its procedural condition 
more obviously. The originality of Habermas’s moral concerns arises from the very 
beginning when he prefers communicative rationality at the expense of purposive 
rationality.  Habermas’s suspicion concerning the common criticisms directed 
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against discursive knowledge led him to develop an understanding that does not 
resemble Kantian and Aristotelian moral theories.  
Today all discursive knowledge is taken to be fallible and more or less 
context dependent, more or less general, more or less rigorous; correlatively 
it is not just the nomological knowledge of the objectifying empirical 
sciences that raises a claim to universal validity. (Habermas, 1993: 25)  
 
The universality claim developed through purposive-rational action of empirical 
sciences led moral theory to raise a claim to objectivity which caused rendering 
discursive knowledge to subjectivity. Indeed social and cultural context limits the 
possibilities for the moral theory to achieve this end. This is an important paradox of 
the moral theory. The moral intuition of individuals in everyday life is taken into 
consideration only through the context of interpersonal relations. Yet, the context is 
understood in such a way that normative validity claims become obsolete.  
 It is commonly agreed that the context which surrounds moral conceptions 
affects the kind of formulation of the norm or the level of its validity. The ideal 
moral norm is the one which resembles historical, factual context in a rightful way. 
On the contrary, this condition is not practical at all. For Habermas this kind of 
conditionality jeopardizes the attempt to construct validity for the moral norms. 
Against historicism and moral / social relativism, he states that:  
The social world toward which we are oriented in the normative attitude is 
historical in a different sense from the laws and regularities that constitute 
the realm of describable events and states of affairs in the objective world. 
(Habermas, 1993: 38)  
 
The way to overcome this discrepancy is the formulation of validity claims of moral 
norms by ignoring the contextual interpretations. Not depending on the ontological 
ethical prepositions would avoid context reliance in moral argument. Stating 
deontological procedural conditions for interpersonal relations will reveal the 
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conditions of validating moral norms, which does not depend on contextual 
specificities.  
Deontological ethical conceptions assume in the final analysis only that the 
moral point of view remains identical; but neither our understanding of this 
fundamental intuition, nor the interpretations we give morally valid rules in 
applying them to unforeseeable cases, remain invariant. (Habermas, 1993: 
39)  
 
Deontological validation in the interpersonal realm is realized by the availability of 
discourse principle.  
 The inclusive process of validation is an important aspect of discourse ethics. 
The inclusive process of validation states that all the individuals who are affected 
from the contested norm should have the right to consider it. “On this fact of 
universal pragmatics is founded the fundamental principle of discourse ethics: only 
moral rules that could win the assent of all affected as participants in a practical 
discourse can claim validity.” (Habermas, 1993: 50) All individuals included in the 
argumentation effect and are affected from the arguments that are presented during 
the argumentation. Perspectives of participants are also understood in this process. 
However in moral theory the objectivity is generally assured through the observance 
of the third person. Third person is not involved in the interaction among disputing 
two persons. Consequently, without interference, third person would be the impartial 
observer. Interestingly, the validity claims of moral norms are formulated through 
first person indicative. The ambiguity arises at the moment when objectivity is 
realized from the point of view of third person whereas the obligatory indicative is 
realized from the viewpoint of first person. As a solution Habermas proposes 
discourse ethics to resolve the viewpoint of third person by nullifying the need for 
impartial viewpoint. There is no need for an impartial person for testing the validity 
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of moral claims. Universality will be achieved, as the third person is included in the 
inclusive process of validation. 
 
 
4.3. Legitimation and Justification 
 
 Having understood the communicative action and discourse ethics it is now 
crucial to analyze the connection of these principles to the functioning of modern 
society. Proposing communicative action as an alternative to purposive-rational 
action, Habermas attempts to solve the problem of legitimation crisis. The 
procedural conception of discourse principle would be providing interpersonal social 
interaction to construct discursive will formation instead of technocratic decision 
making processes. In the next phase of his theoretical inquiry, Habermas intended to 
analyze the constitutional state and rule of law with regard to modern legal theory. 
As a result, he positioned discourse theory in a context of deliberative politics in full 
realization of its legal conditions. (Rehg, 1998) The place of legal theory is 
important to understand since it is the next phase of procedural political functioning 
of society in public sphere. The legitimacy of the state will be fully portrayed after 
assuring the legal order in line with the insights provided by discourse principle and 
democratic legitimacy through communicative rationality.  
 The source of legitimacy through discourse principle depends first, on the 
procedural conceptualization of democratic legitimacy and second, through the 
conceptualization of modern legal system as a mediating system in itself. Procedural 
conceptualization of discourse principle is understood so far but the justification 
through the existing practices of legal system needs clarification. According to 
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Habermas, moral law itself can become the source of legitimacy since it is defined 
properly as a formal and neutral instrument for the working of modern society. 
Discourse principle enables the understanding that positive law functions as an 
important procedural system. “The philosopher should be satisfied with the insight 
that in complex societies, law is the only medium in which it is possible reliably to 
establish morally obligated relationships of mutual respect even among strangers.” 
(Habermas, 1994: 460) Law would provide expected outcomes unlike the human 
behavior if let to act as it wills. The legal system is the basic regulative constraint in 
the interpersonal realm. With the discourse principle, law is the perfect instrument 
for procedural functioning of the public uses of reason in modern democracies.  
 
 
4.4. Public Sphere 
 
 Having understood the discourse principle as a procedural conception and 
the legal system as a complement to the legitimacy of communicative society, it is 
now essential to consider the role of public sphere. Understanding public space is 
important for Habermas’s discourse theory first for the realization of the context in 
which the type of community arises under the framework of ideal speech situation. 
Second, it is important in the sense that public conceptualization defines the type of 
participation of citizens in which they are affected and they affect in turn. Habermas 
defines public sphere as “a network for communicating information and points of 
view; the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in 
such a way they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions.” 
(Habermas, 1996: 360) The foundational element in the conception of public sphere 
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is communication, because public sphere is socially reproduced in communicative 
action. Public sphere appears at the basic level of interpersonal communication. 
 Public space in the discursive model calls for the establishment of legitimate 
grounds of a society for the citizens in which they participate. “… [Public space] is 
viewed democratically as the creation of procedures whereby those effected by 
general social norms and by collective political decisions can have a say in their 
formulation, stipulation and adoption.” (Benhabib, 1992: 104) Public discourse is 
constructed by the public. The public conforms to the conceptualization of discourse 
ethics. There is no concern for neutral conceptualization of the public sphere since it 
aims at the development of a discourse regardless of its ends. The procedural 
condition of public discourse is the only condition that goes beyond liberal 
neutrality.  
 The construction of the conditions of discourse enables those participants 
who would be affected from public space to evaluate their validity claims. The 
evaluation for validity arises whenever participants engage in discourse. The more 
open and valid – in terms of the procedural constraints – discourse ethics become, 
the more deliberative society is realized. Public space as defined in terms of its 
discursive procedural conditions enables different kinds of publicly defined 
conceptualizations to live together for the realization of different goods. Discourse 
ethics is not ends oriented because it does not define by any means, any ends but 
only the procedure in which public sphere realizes itself. Consequently, there can be 
different modes of public spaces living together in one conceptualization of public 
discourse. (Benhabib, 1992) 
 The availability of more than one public space living under the same 
procedural condition means an inclusionary concept of participation in contrast to 
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many liberal conceptions that provide exclusionary participatory mechanisms 
through regulative moral principles or strictly defined rights and obligations for 
citizens. Habermas’s concept of discursive public space does not consider any 
conception of good for the society as a whole. It is merely procedural as compared 
to other liberal conceptions. Accepting the conditions of argumentation in public 
sphere is the first and foremost principle to enter into discourse. The only condition 
to enter into discourse is accepting the interpersonal conditionality of discourse 
ethics. In liberal theories, entering into public decision-making mechanisms requires 
a certain level of self-commitment to the system. In Rawlsian public reason, the 
condition to enter into public discourse is the acceptance of two basic principles of 
political liberalism. This condition confers a burden over the individual for self-
realization of the basic principles of the society. This moment is crucial because it 
points Habermas’s procedural conception against Rawls’s relatively more 
substantive argument concerning the conditions of inclusion. I will deal with this 
issue in the next chapter. Now it is essential to further analyze Habermas’s position 
depending on the discourse principle.  
 
 
4.5. Deliberation Through Discourse Principle 
 
 Democratic politics is viewed as reaching to a compromise among 
competing interests in its liberal understanding. Basic rights and liberties should be 
guaranteed for the realization of democratic legitimacy so that individuals will freely 
participate in the democratic processes. It is supposed to be an inclusive process 
since it is supported by universal suffrage and backed by basic human rights. On the 
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contrary, the technical side of the process overvalues practical reason in a 
unidirectional way that might not favor the rights of citizens in every instance. 
Sometimes the executive powers of democratic states undermine the rights of 
individuals depending on social justice and conceptions of common good. Avoiding 
this problem can be sustained through employing measures for bidirectional 
governance. Against the unidirectional practical reason of democratic practices there 
is a possibility of bidirectional participatory mechanisms. This is accomplished by 
discourse principle. It is a way of conforming to the rules of deliberative politics.  
 
Democratic procedure, which establishes a network of pragmatic 
considerations, compromises and discourses of self-understanding and of 
justice, grounds the presumption that reasonable or fair results are obtained 
insofar as the flow of relevant information and its proper handling have not 
been obstructed. (Habermas, 1996: 296)  
 
The source of deliberative legitimacy is deontological support of discourse principle. 
Communicative powers of citizens are the basic means for their participation in the 
deliberative processes and it is guaranteed by the basic rights and freedoms as well 
as discourse principle itself. Can the results of deliberative processes jeopardize the 
legitimacy of democracy? 
 Devoting all of its foundational strength to communicative processes of 
deliberation Habemas’s discourse theory assumes all possible outcomes to be 
reasonable. For this purpose it is essential that the deliberation should be all-
inclusive.  
Deliberative politics acquires its legitimating force from the discursive 
structure of an opinion – and will – formation that can fulfill its socially 
integrative function only because citizens expect its results to have a 
reasonable quality. Hence the discursive level of public debates constitutes 
the most important variable. It must not be hidden away in the black box of 
an operationalization satisfied with crude indicators. (Habermas, 1996: 304)  
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Everything is open to public discourse on the condition that its intentions are also 
open to public deliberation. By assuming the possibility of remembering and 
reminding the requirements of ideal speech situation in public intersubjective 
discussions on validity, Habermas has trust on the results of the public discourse to 
have reasonable results. In the ideal speech situation the most important variable that 
avoids such an outcome is the condition that communicative powers of individuals 
are not used for personal interests.  
 Inclusionary power of deliberative politics through discourse principle is its 
flexibility to consider informal procedures of communication and deliberation to 
come together with formal procedures. “Deliberative politics thus lives off the 
interplay between democratically institutionalized will-formation and informal 
opinion-formation.” (Habermas, 1996: 308) For liberal views informal channels of 
deliberation should be excluded from the formal democratic procedures to assure 
neutrality and exclude substantive claims. In this sense, Habermas departs from 
liberal models of rationality and decision-making.  
 
 
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
 This chapter aimed at exploring Habermas’s discourse principle and 
foundations of discourse ethics in order to grasp his view on the public uses of 
reason. As he indicates in Postscript to Between Facts and Norms, the discourse 
principle lays down the conditions for citizens’ public uses of reason. Rawls’s 
concept of public reason does not resemble discourse principle but the goals Rawls 
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and Habermas are trying to achieve through these principles are almost the same. 
The discourse principle points to the conditions in the public sphere in which 
citizens will be participating through using their communicative powers. It is 
basically a procedural principle and Habermas’s main attempt in its evaluation is to 
stress this point of procedural conceptualization. The discourse principle allows to 
overcome the discrepancies in democratic society under the conditions of technical 
and unidirectional attempts to control the legal and legislative processes.  
 For Habermas, the domination of purposive rationality in modern society can 
empower individuals’ potential to seize emancipatory opportunities. Scientization of 
modern society is one evil that forced Habermas to reevaluate the conditions of 
public sphere. Habermas’s proposal for unleashing communicative rationality as an 
alternative to instrumental rationality is the basic foundational tool in his theory.  
The interpersonal context provided by communicative action would be the 
new emancipatory tool for democracy. The new interpersonal context would be 
regulated through a moral precept which is genuinely called the discourse ethics. 
Discourse ethics defines the limits of the public sphere that individuals are 
participating. In Habermas’s terms, like communicative action, discourse ethics 
depends on the interpersonal realm rather than egoistic personal realm. (Johnson, 
1991: 188-194) Discourse ethics stems from the agreement potential of 
communication. It evaluates participants’ validity claims for the rightness of their 
arguments. On the contrary many moral theories evaluate truth claims of 
individuals. Discourse ethics transcends contextual constraints – social, political, 
historical. The only contextual constraint is the context of the interpersonal realm 
which is basically defined in the public sphere. For Habermas, public sphere may 
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include many formal and informal contexts. Accordingly, discourse ethics attempts 
to include as many participants as possible for public argumentation.  
Habermas assumes individuals to use their communicative liberties in the 
pursuit of public reason. However, there are no guarantees in discourse ethics that 
prevent citizens from using their communicative liberties in the pursuit of their 
personal interests. Strategic action may still dominate the public sphere and 
interpersonal relations. Only an impartial legal order is presented as a guarantee to 
prevent the abuse of liberties in the public sphere. Law itself becomes the source of 
legitimacy for the deliberative democratic society.  
Habermas’s conception of public sphere is inclusive. It attempts to include 
all disregarding the personal moral convictions of the participants. Similarly, in 
Rawls’s original position personal and moral convictions of the participants are also 
disregarded. However, Habermas argues that any issue can come to public, subject 
to discourse ethics, whereas for Rawls only public political issues should be voiced 
in the public realm. In Habermas’s theory the only condition for inclusion is 
compliance with the discourse principle. On the contrary, in Rawls there is the 
assumption that the system would guarantee the basic rights and liberties of 
individuals through the implementation of the principle of rule of law. This aspect of 
democratic legitimacy should not be taken as an instrument for exclusion.  
The procedural conception of public uses of reason is constituted against 
more substantive conception of Rawls’s public reason in the debate for deliberative 
democracy. Unlike Rawls, for Habermas public reason does not consider a shared 
political conception. The debate between Rawls and Habermas will indicate the 
differences and similarities in more detail. Let me now turn to the debate.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE DEBATE BETWEEN RAWLS AND HABERMAS 
 
 
 
 One of the most important debates on public reason has taken place between 
John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. This debate is about major issues concerning 
democratic theory and deliberative democracy. Indeed, these issues take their 
starting points from different interpretations of Kant’s practical philosophy. The 
dispute that brings two philosophers to argue around similar matters of practical 
philosophy also indicates the similarity in their approaches to contemporary issues 
in political theory. Both Rawls and Habermas are known as the leading philosophers 
who established the premises of deliberative democracy. However, they have two 
distinct interpretations for the basic matters of deliberative democracy. The debate 
took root after two major books by Rawls and Habermas were published. Habermas 
published Between Facts and Norms (1992) as an essential work that examines the 
problems in modern democracies. Rawls published Political Liberalism (1993) that 
works out the issues in Theory (1971) with an emphasis on pluralism in 
constitutional democracies9. After Rawls and Habermas, many scholars contributed 
                                                 
9 The concerns of Rawls for revising Theory in Political Liberalism is presented in the previous 
chapters of my thesis. See:  2.2. From Theory to Political Liberalism: 17-20. 
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and expanded this debate.10 The debate is explicated and analyzed in Thomas 
McCarthy’s “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in 
Dialogue” (1994) in which Rawls and Habermas are presented in a dialogue of 
compromise. Then, Habermas’s “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: 
Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism” (1995) asserts almost an 
unbridgeable gap between his approach and that of Rawls. Rawls reacted to 
Habermas in “Reply to Habermas” in the same issue of The Journal of Philosophy in 
199511 where he argued that the difference between them arises from Habermas’s 
comprehensive worldview.  
 The significance of the debate between Rawls and Habermas in terms of 
public reason is the fact that it concerns the conception of public use of reason. This 
debate enables us to understand the centrality of the issue of public reason in the 
theory of democracy. There are basically four points of dispute. First point of 
dispute arises around Rawls’s conception of original position and Habermas’s ideal 
discourse situation. Both conceptions attempt to establish an initial condition12. The 
                                                 
10 Kenneth Baynes published The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism in 1992 in which Kant, 
Rawls and Habermas are studied in a comparative perspective. Seyla Benhabib analyzed two 
approaches in Situating the Self, especially in terms of the conceptions of public. Joshua Cohen is 
influenced from Rawls and Habermas in “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in The Good 
Polity, (ed.) A. Hamlin and P. Pettit Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 
 
11 I used the article “Reply to Habermas”, reprinted in Political Liberalism: 372-434. 
 
12 The initial condition is meant to provide the starting point before a social theory is presented like in 
the case of ‘state of nature’ in social contract theories. In social contract theories, an abstract 
hypothetical initial position is conceptualized, which is the state of nature, and a contract is formed to 
construct a society. Justice as fairness is founded upon the conception that a person does not enter a 
society through a contract but through accepting a particular conception of justice. Persons in an 
initial position of equality accept justice as fairness. Similar to the conception of state of nature in 
social contract theories, Rawls conceptualizes the original position. According to Rawls, Habermas’s 
ideal speech situation constitutes an initial condition because in the ideal discourse situation, the ideal 
speech situation is to ground a state of equality in the process of argumentation. Only with this 
requirement as an initial condition, participants are expected to accept the conditions of ideal 
discourse situation. However, Habermas does not seem to agree with this comment. For him ideal 
speech situation is a lived process and not an initial condition. In the ideal speech situation; (1) 
everyone with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse, (2) everyone is 
allowed to question any assertion, (3) everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into 
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second point of dispute concerns overlapping consensus and justification. This point 
indeed is a question of validity posed by Habermas to Rawls. The third point is 
about public and private autonomy in Rawls’s theory. Habermas raises the question 
of autonomy starting from its Kantian roots to Political Liberalism. The last point of 
dispute is about substantive and comprehensive aspects of Habermas’s approach, 
raised by Rawls. At this point, Rawls responds to Habermas by stating that his 
theory is procedural and Habermas’s theory is substantive. In this chapter, I try to 
present the debate in general with an attempt to compare and contrast the basic 
arguments in this debate. The analysis of the debate indicates most important 
controversial and problematic points related to public reason. The best way in 
presenting the debate is through its own development of the ideas. Thus in every 
section points of dispute will be presented in order.  
 
 
5.1. Original Position versus Ideal Discourse Situation 
 
 According to Rawls, both original position and ideal discourse situation are 
devices of representation. Original position is a situation in which persons decide to 
choose the principles of justice without knowing their social and natural status in 
society. It is an abstract mental construction. Through the principle of original 
position Rawls aims at reaching a conception of justice which is free from 
advantages and disadvantages originating from contingent means. Consequently, the 
principles of justice that participants are going to decide should not favor any 
                                                                                                                                         
the discourse, (4) everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs. See Habermas: 
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, and Habermas: Justification and Application. 
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particular group or person in the society. (Rawls, 1999: 11) Persons decide to choose 
the principles of justice without knowing their social and natural status in the 
society. This condition of not knowing essential personal features is called the veil of 
ignorance. The principles of justice are  
 
[1] Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic rights and liberties …, [2] Social and economic inequalities are to 
satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, 
they are to be the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society. (Rawls, 1996: 6)  
 
In the ideal discourse situation participants are socialized in similar 
conditions so that they are capable of understanding and judging each other’s truth 
claims. (Habermas, 1996: 322) In the ideal discourse situation, discourse principle is 
in effect which states that  
Anyone who seriously engages in argumentation must presuppose that the 
context of discussion guarantees in principle freedom of access, equal rights 
to participate, truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in 
adopting positions, and so on. If the participants genuinely want to 
convince one another, they must make the pragmatic assumption that they 
allow their ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses to be influenced solely by the force of 
the better argument. (Habermas, 1993: 31)13   
 
 In both the original position and the ideal discourse situation the aim is to 
define a point before14 public deliberation. In the original position an initial 
condition of equality is desired. In the ideal discourse situation, an initial condition 
of equality is not sought in material terms but a condition of equal situation and 
symmetry in terms of communication abilities are tried to be thematized.  
                                                 
13 This quotation is important to indicate discourse principle in Habermas’s original terms.  
 
14 Here ‘before’ is presumed and it is distanced from actual. This is true for Rawls’s interpretation. 
For Habermas ideal discourse situation is applicable any time during the discourse. It is embedded in 
communication in every language.  
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5.1.1. Critique of the Original Position 
 
 According to Habermas, conception of persons in the Rawlsian approach 
brings a paradox when the idea of original position is introduced. He states that the 
autonomy of citizens in a well-ordered society is ignored in the original position.  
Citizens are assumed to be moral persons who possess a sense of justice 
and the capacity for their own conception of the good, as well as an interest 
in cultivating these dispositions in a rational manner. But in the case of the 
parties in the original position, these reasonable characteristics of moral 
persons are replaced by the constraints of a rational design. (Habermas, 
1995: 112)  
 
Habermas’s first argument against original position claims that persons who should 
understand principles of justice are going to decide about them after the initial 
position but they are incapacitated of their cognitive capacities to do this during the 
decision-making process.  
In the Rawlsian original position, rights are introduced as primary goods. 
According to Habermas, the second argument against original position is 
considering rights in terms of goods. Goods are persons’ needs for life. Rights are 
considered as one type of goods. In this sense justice is considered in terms of the 
just distribution of goods. However, rights are realized not as a problem of 
distribution of goods. “Precisely because Rawls adheres to a conception of justice on 
which autonomy of citizens is constituted through rights, the paradigm of 
distribution generates difficulties for [Rawls].” (Habermas, 1995: 114) Rights are 
exercised by persons, they are not an issue of distribution. Rights are to regulate 
relations among persons. In this sense, according to Habermas, original position 
jeopardizes Rawls’s position in the rest of his theoretical framework. Original 
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position is founded upon the idea that rights are considered as goods. According to 
Habermas:  
… [T]he conceptual constraints of the model of rational choice preclude 
Rawls from construing basic liberties from the outset as basic rights and 
compel him to interpret them as primary goods. This leads him to assimilate 
the deontological meaning of obligatory norms to the teleological meaning 
of preferred values. (Habermas, 1995: 114)15  
 
The primary disagreement about the rights and goods seems to take its ground from 
Rawls’s intention in providing a framework of distributive justice and its social 
critiques.16  
The original position is a revised form of Kant’s categorical imperative. 
Categorical imperative is the universal moral law in Kant’s philosophy. It tries to 
construct an objective principle of morality. Just like categorical imperative allows 
us freedom from hypothetical imperatives – imperatives that are bound to an end 
which are egoistic and interest oriented and purposively rational –, in Rawls original 
position allows us to imagine justice free from our partial, selfish and socially 
contingent desires and positions. Rawls’s intention in revising categorical imperative 
through the conception of original position is accomplished with the help of veil of 
ignorance. In Habermas’s terms, veil of ignorance is depriving persons of their 
practical reasoning. Consequently, Habermas argues that the original position would 
                                                 
15 Deontological is different from teleological. “Teleological ethics focuses on outcomes; 
deontological ethics is much more concerned with balancing competing rights and obligations. 
However, each of these types of ethics has several variations. For instance, both ethical egoism and 
utilitarianism are teleological theories, yet they are fundamentally distinct in nature and implications. 
Similarly, deontological monism and deontological pluralism are both deontological theories but they 
differ in how they function.”  web.uvic.ca/philosophy/phil331/readings/unit3big.html, viewed on 10 
September 2003.  
 
16 “… [D]istributively oriented theories conceptualize questions of justice, whether of particular 
actions or practices, or of the pattern of rights and inequalities of a whole society, primarily as 
questions concerning the fair allocation of social goods, including non-material goods, among 
individuals.” (Young, 286). For a more elaborate discussion see Young: “Toward a Critical Theory of 
Justice” and Baynes: “From Distributive Justice to Normative Social Criticism” in The Normative 
Grounds of Social Criticism pp. 153-181 
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be revised in a way that it shall become an intersubjectively applied procedure. 
Depriving participants of their practical reasons deprives them of information, which 
is essential for understanding their situation. In line with this critique, Habermas 
proposes a solution.  
 
… I believe that Rawls could avoid the difficulties associated with the 
design of an original position if he operationalized the moral point of view 
in a different way, namely, if he kept the procedural conception of practical 
reason free of substantive connotations by developing it in a strictly 
procedural manner. (Habermas, 1995: 116)  
 
Habermas proposes ideal discourse situation and discourse ethics as an alternative in 
this manner.  
I have in mind the more open procedure of an argumentative practice that 
proceeds under the demanding presuppositions of the ‘public use of reason’ 
and does not bracket the pluralism of convictions and worldviews from the 
outset. (Habermas, 1995: 118)  
 
The kind of procedural conception that Habermas has in mind will be explained in 
the next section.  
 
 
5.1.2. Critique of the Ideal Discourse Situation 
 
 According to Rawls, in Political Liberalism, the original position contributes 
to a political conception of justice. A political conception of justice draws the 
boundaries in political society in terms of realizing the conceptions of equality and 
freedom. A political conception of justice would enable citizens to leave their 
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comprehensive worldviews aside in public matters and to endorse a shared public 
conception of justice.  
The original position is an analytical device used to formulate a conjecture. 
The conjecture is that when we ask – What are the most reasonable 
principles of political justice for a constitutional democracy whose citizens 
are seen as free and equal, reasonable and rational? – the answer is that 
these principles are given by a device of representation in which rational 
parties (as trustees of citizens, one for each) are situated in reasonable 
conditions and constrained by these conditions absolutely. (Rawls, 1996: 
381)  
 
Original position is an essential device of representation to guarantee a political 
conception of justice to be consolidated. On the contrary, ideal discourse situation 
does not guarantee any political conception of justice to dominate public condition. 
Ideal discourse situation calls for validity of practical reason. It presumes that after 
initial conditions for ideal discourse situation is met the result of rational discourse 
is morally valid. As a result, rational participants are expected to accept the 
outcome. In this sense, the ideal discourse situation establishes the foundations for 
comprehensive arguments.  
The kind of procedural conception that Habermas has in mind is indeed the 
discourse ethics. Discourse ethics tries to construct a clear understanding of 
discourse principle in its application to normal life conditions and its relation to free 
will of the individuals. It does not provide a substantive definition of a moral 
conception but lays down rules of the game for a procedural understanding of 
democratic legitimacy. As he describes:  
Discourse ethics rests on the intuition that the application of the principle of 
universalization, properly understood, calls for a joint process of ‘ideal role 
taking’. … Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and 
noncoercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone 
is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself 
into the understandings of self and world of all others; from this 
interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally extended we-
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perspective from which all can test in common whether they wish to make a 
controversial norm the basis of their shared practice; and this should 
include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the languages in terms of 
which situations and needs are interpreted. (Habermas, 1995: 117)  
 
On the other hand, Rawls’s overlapping consensus and reasonableness is an attempt 
to limit the pluralism of different worldviews from the very outset. Limiting the 
pluralism of worldviews is not desirable for the full realization of public uses of 
reason. Habermas proposes a more inclusive view of procedural conception than 
Rawls in which the plurality of worldviews is not limited.  
 
 
5.2. Overlapping Consensus and Justification 
 
 For Rawls, in the condition of reasonable pluralism a certain conception of 
justice is supposed to balance different comprehensive worldviews. The condition 
that citizens of every reasonable comprehensive worldview accept a shared 
conception of justice is the fact of overlapping consensus. Overlapping consensus is 
not a mere consensus on basic matters of justice but it requires the commitment of 
those who accept the fact of reasonable pluralism. It aims at assuring stability among 
different comprehensive worldviews in the society. The consensus in political 
liberalism is overlapping in the sense that it does not try to reconcile various 
comprehensive worldviews but it provides a conception that persons, belonging to 
various comprehensive worldviews, are expected to endorse. Overlapping consensus 
is not decided through considering various worldviews and reaching a modus 
vivendi among them. Rather, overlapping consensus is attained as a freestanding 
view that comprehensive worldviews are expected to endorse.  
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 Habermas analyzed Rawls’s concern for justification in terms of justice as 
fairness. Justice as fairness is a public conception of justice in a well-ordered 
society. The terms and conditions of justice are designed to construct the basic 
structure of society. Justice as fairness is justified by reference to the conception of 
person. The conception of person is a moral conception that enables citizens to 
adhere to a sense of justice and to have a capacity for the conception of the good. 
Citizens participate in the fair terms of cooperation to the public conception of 
justice because they have a sense of justice. Citizens adhere to a variety of 
worldviews and endorse plurality of interests because of their capacity for a 
conception of good. Consequently, Rawls justified his theory by developing a 
political conception of justice as opposed to a metaphysical conception. Related to 
the fact that Rawls justified his position by a political conception of justice, 
overlapping consensus should contribute to this conception in a positive manner. 
Habermas is concerned with the contribution of overlapping consensus to the 
justification of Rawls’s theory.  
I should examine whether the overlapping consensus, on which the theory 
of justice depends, plays a cognitive or merely instrumental role: whether it 
primarily contributes to the further justification of the theory or whether it 
serves, in the light of the prior justification of the theory, to explicate a 
necessary condition of social stability (1). Connected with this is the 
question of the sense in which Rawls uses the predicate ‘reasonable’: as a 
predicate for the validity of moral judgments or for the reflective attitude of 
enlightened tolerance (2). (Habermas, 1995: 119)  
 
 Overlapping consensus is founded on the principle of justice as fairness. For 
the stable co-existence of different worldviews in society, the conception of person 
is crucial. In Habermas’s terms the conception of person should be neutral. Justice 
as fairness should also establish the conditions of stability so that the plurality of 
worldviews is realized. Thus the overlapping consensus aims at two purposes; 
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justification of the theory and stability of the society. According to Habermas, these 
two distinct purposes cannot be accomplished through a single device. Rawls should 
distinguish between the acceptability of the conception of justice as fairness and 
acceptance of the conditions of overlapping consensus among contending 
worldviews. (Habermas, 1995: 120-122) 
 Habermas’s second concern is about the conception of reasonable. 
According to Rawls, reasonable agents in society are concerned with the fact that 
they are living in a society with others in a fair system of cooperation. In this sense, 
reasonable agents consider others in society while at the same time, pursuing their 
own interests as rational agents. On the other hand, Habermas argues that the 
conception of reasonable confers problems.  
Either we understand ‘reasonable’ in the sense of practical reason as 
synonymous with ‘morally true’, that is, as a validity concept analogous to 
truth and on the same plane as prepositional truth; this reading is supported 
by at least one line of argumentation (a). Or we understand ‘reasonable’ in 
more or less the same sense as ‘thoughtfulness’ in dealing with debatable 
views whose truth is for the present undecided; then ‘reasonable’ is 
employed as a higher-level predicate concerned with more with ‘reasonable 
disagreements’, and hence with the fallibilistic consciousness and civil 
demeanor of persons, than with the validity of their assertions. In general, 
Rawls seems to favor this latter reading. (Habermas, 1995: 123)  
 
 Against Habermas’s criticisms concerning the justification, Rawls proposes a 
clarification. According to Rawls, there are three different kinds of justification that 
needs to be distinguished in political liberalism. Understanding these conceptions 
will enable us to understand the idea of stability for the right reasons and the idea of 
legitimacy. The idea of stability for the right reasons is realized in which a society is 
regulated by a reasonable political conception of justice. The political conception of 
justice is backed by a reasonable overlapping consensus of the participants. Those 
who accept this consensus are in majority with respect to contenders. Public 
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discussions are decided in line with the most reasonable political conception of 
justice.  
 The first kind of justification is pro tanto justification. In pro tanto 
justification, justification of public reason is realized only through political values. 
“… [T]he political values specified by it can be suitably ordered, or balanced, so that 
those values alone give a reasonable answer by public reason to all or nearly all 
questions concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice.” (Rawls, 1996: 386) 
Considering arguments in public reasoning in the light of the political values 
justifies those arguments in terms of political liberalism. In this sense, every citizen 
would understand the values that indicate comprehensive worldviews to be 
reasonable or not.  Non-reasonable worldviews are assumed to lack support for 
political values. (Rawls, 1996: 241-244) 
 Second kind of justification is full justification. It is left to the citizen as 
individual. “… [T]he citizen accepts a political conception and fills out its 
justification by embedding it in some way into the citizen’s comprehensive doctrine 
as either true or reasonable, depending on what the doctrine allows.” (Rawls, 1996: 
386) Justification in the eyes of individuals indicates its full justification. Citizens 
decide any view to be compatible with political values.  
 Third kind of justification is accomplished by society. It is the public 
justification. “Public justification happens when all the reasonable members of 
political society carry out a justification of the shared political conception by 
embedding it in their several reasonable comprehensive views.” (Rawls, 1996: 387) 
In the society citizens have a mutual understanding of every other’s commitment to 
the public conception of justice. Citizens endorse the very basic idea of public 
justification but not to their personal commitments for comprehensive worldviews. 
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Consequently, reasonable overlapping consensus is fully realized. As the reasonable 
overlapping consensus is realized, the justification of political liberalism is 
complete.  
 According to Rawls, public justification helps stability for the right reasons 
to be established. Stability in society is part of the public justification. Public 
justification further contributes to democratic legitimacy.  
If we can make the case that there are adequate reasons for diverse 
reasonable people jointly to affirm justice as fairness as their working 
political conception, then the conditions for their legitimately exercising 
coercive political power over one another – something we inevitably do as 
citizens by voting, if no other way – are satisfied. The argument, if 
successful, would show how we can reasonably affirm and appeal to a 
political conception of justice as citizens’ shared basis of reasons, all the 
while supposing that others no less reasonable than we, may also affirm and 
recognize that same basis. Despite the fact of reasonable pluralism, the 
conditions for democratic legitimacy are fulfilled. (Rawls, 1996: 390)  
 
A political society with overlapping consensus establishes the foundation for social 
unity. Social unity leads democratic polity to stability for the right reasons which 
can be called legitimate stability17. Without commitment to a political conception of 
justice, consensus remains at the level of a modus vivendi. Thus stability is left to 
power struggles among contending comprehensive worldviews. Consequently, 
social unity would not be accomplished.  
 Coming to Habermas’s question on the conception of reasonable, Rawls does 
not add a new comment regarding truth claims of moral judgments. He argues:  
Political liberalism does not use the concept of moral truth applied to its 
own political (always moral) judgments. Here it says that political 
judgments are reasonable or unreasonable; and it lays out political ideals, 
principles and standards as criteria of the reasonable. (Rawls, 1996: 394)  
 
                                                 
17 I am grateful to Cem Deveci for this concept that makes the context easily comprehendible.  
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The idea of reasonable is sufficient in public reasoning so that claim for truth is not 
considered. The conception of reasonable also expresses a reflective attitude in 
terms of toleration. In brief terms, Habermas asked whether the conception of 
reasonable express a truth claim for moral judgments or does it express a reflective 
attitude to toleration? Rawls replied this question by stating that the conception of 
reasonable expresses both. Reasonable agents in society are concerned with the fact 
that they are living in a society with others in a fair system of cooperation. In this 
sense, reasonable agents consider the impact of their actions on others in the society. 
Consequently, in reasonable pluralism only those worldviews are included as part of 
the political system which reasonable citizens accept to endorse. 
 
 
5.3. Private and Public Autonomy 
 
The difference between Rawls and Habermas can be traced back to their own 
assessments on republicanism and liberalism. Both Rawls and Habermas try to 
combine republicanism and liberalism in a single project. Nevertheless, they 
emphasize different points in the compromise between republicanism and liberalism 
which leads to a controversy in their approaches. Rawls prioritize rights as a set of 
liberal principles above all other concerns and limits the public deliberation to 
political issues. Habermas emphasizes communicative action and proposes a 
contentless procedure in the public forum. The distinction between liberals and 
republicans is considered by reference to the liberties of the ancients and the liberties 
of the moderns.  
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Liberals have stressed the ‘liberties of the moderns’: liberty of belief and 
conscience, the protection of life, personal liberty, and property – in sum, 
the core of subjective private rights. Republicanism, by contrast, has 
defended the ‘liberties of the ancients’: the political rights of participation 
and communication that make possible the citizens’ exercise of self-
determination. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Kant shared the aspiration of 
deriving both elements from the same root, namely from moral and political 
autonomy: the liberal rights may neither be merely foisted on the practice 
of self-determination as extrinsic constraints nor be made merely 
instrumental to its exercise. (Habermas, 1995: 127)  
 
In the same line of thought Rawls follows Rousseau and Kant’s attempts so that he 
formulated first principle of justice in accord with these concerns. (Rawls, 1996: 
196) However, Habermas concludes that Rawls’s conception of original position in 
one level and Rawls’s conception of moral persons in another indicates the priority 
of liberal rights over the republican liberties.  
Public political autonomy is conceptualized at the level of the original 
position. Habermas argues that this autonomy is not fully realized later, at the level 
of democratic procedure.  
For the higher the veil of ignorance is raised and the more Rawls’s citizens 
themselves take on real flesh and blood, the more deeply they find 
themselves subject to principles and norms that have been anticipated in 
theory and have already become institutionalized beyond their control. 
(Habermas, 1995: 128)  
 
Against this critique, Rawls proposes a four-stage sequence of democratic 
procedure. First, citizens decide principles of justice in the original position – in the 
way Mill conceptualizes. Second, citizens decide rules of a constitution following 
the principles of justice. Third, citizens become legislators of their own laws which 
are laid down in the constitution – as Rousseau intends to do. Fourth, citizens 
become judges to interpret the laws – similarly as Kant develops Rousseau’s point 
of view. Although Habermas assumes that knowledge available to citizens in one 
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level – the original position – contradicts with the knowledge available in another 
level – democratic procedure –, Rawls assumes the possibility of different 
information available at each stage of democratic procedure. The four-stage 
sequence conceptualizes the original position as a device of representation, extended 
into the democratic procedure.  
Habermas argues that public reason in Rawls is a completed project of 
constitution making and institutionalization of politics.  
From the perspective of the theory of justice, the act of founding the 
democratic constitution cannot be repeated under the institutional 
conditions of an already constituted just society, and the process of 
realizing the system of basic rights cannot be assured on an ongoing basis. 
It is not possible for the citizens to experience this process as open and 
incomplete, as the shifting historical circumstances nonetheless demand. 
(Habermas, 1995: 128)  
 
Public reason as a stable condition does not allow citizens to exercise their reasons 
in the political process as an ongoing process. As a response, Rawls argues that the 
four-stage sequence allows citizens to continue democratic procedure in discussions 
and deliberations. Political autonomy is a condition in political liberalism so that 
citizens can continue with their deliberations in the public as an ongoing process. 
Rawls states that the ideal of just constitution cannot be a completed project but 
should be understood as an ongoing process.  
To make clearer the idea of political autonomy we say, first, that citizens 
gain full political autonomy when they live under a reasonably just 
constitution securing their liberty and equality, with all of the appropriate 
subordinate laws and precepts regulating the basic structure, and when they 
also fully comprehend and endorse this constitution and its laws, as well as 
adjust and revise them as changing social circumstances require, always 
suitably moved by their sense of justice and the other political virtues. To 
this we add, second, that whenever the constitution and laws are in various 
ways unjust and imperfect, citizens with reason strive to become more 
autonomous by doing what, in their historical and social circumstances, can 
be reasonably and rationally seen to advance their full autonomy. (Rawls, 
1996: 402)  
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Rawls’s understanding of the political refers to, first, a conception of justice 
which is distinguished a metaphysical conception and which neutral with respect to 
comprehensive worldviews in society. Second, political conception is interested in 
the public matters. In this sense, the sphere of political values is differentiated from 
other value spheres. Habermas finds this the differentiation of public from the non-
public problematic in Rawls’s theory.  
For only with reference to political values, whatever they may be, can he 
split the moral person into the public identity of a citizen and the nonpublic 
identity of a private person shaped by her individual conception of the 
good. These two identities then constitute the reference points for two 
domains, the one constituted by rights of political participation and 
communication, the other protected by basic liberal rights. (Habermas, 
1995: 129)  
 
The domain which is constituted by the rights of political participation and 
communication is the domain of the political. The domain which is protected by 
basic liberal rights is the domain of the private. For Habermas, what constitutes the 
private domain is for Rawls the domain of non-public. On the contrary, Rawls’s 
four-stage sequence clarifies Rawls’s position in terms of the liberties for public and 
non-public spheres.  
The four-stage sequence fits, then, with the idea that the liberties of the 
moderns are subject to the constituent will of the people. Put in terms of 
that sequence, the people – or better, those citizens if any who affirm justice 
as fairness – are making a judgment at the stage of a constitutional 
convention. (Rawls, 1996: 406)  
 
In this way, Rawls constitutes political values, he accomplishes to found bases for 
both the liberties of the ancients and the liberties of the moderns. Thus, he reconciles 
Rousseau’s republicanism with Mill’s liberalism while revising Kantian public use 
of reason. 
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5.4. Procedural versus Substantive Theory 
 
 Habermas argued in his article that Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness 
is substantive although it was designed to be procedural.  
Philosophy shoulders different theoretical burdens when, as on Rawls’s 
conception, it claims to elaborate the idea of a just society, while the 
citizens then use this idea as a platform which to judge existing 
arrangements and policies. (Habermas, 1995: 131)  
 
Rawls disagrees with Habermas’s arguments. According to Rawls substantive and 
procedural aspects of the idea of justice are interrelated. The substantive aspects of 
justice as fairness is that it is a liberal view and any liberal view is substantive. It is a 
liberal view because justice as fairness accepts priority of rights as a prior 
conception to the goods. Nevertheless this does not mean that justice as fairness is a 
metaphysical conception. It is political for the reasons presented before. Rawls 
explains the differences between procedural justice and substantive justice as justice 
of procedure and justice of its outcome. In this case justice of procedure indeed 
depends on justice of its outcome. Justice of a procedure is procedural in the sense 
that its outcome depends on fair division. Justice of its outcome depends on intrinsic 
value judgments, although it has an accepted procedural set up.  
 In a similar line of thought, interestingly, Rawls argues that Habermas’s 
conception of discourse theory is substantive.  
To be sure [Habermas] thinks of the discourse-theoretic idea as restricted to 
an analysis of the moral point of view and the procedure of democratic 
legitimation. And he leaves substantial questions calling for answers ‘here 
and now’ to be settled by the more or less enlightened discussions of 
citizens. (Rawls, 1996: 424)  
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For Rawls, Habermas founds his theory on substantive assumptions. Rawls indicates 
that there are values of the procedure of discourse ethics. In discourse ethics:  
Anyone who seriously engages in argumentation must presuppose that the 
context of discussion guarantees in principle freedom of access, equal rights 
to participate, truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in 
adopting positions, and so on. If the participants genuinely want to 
convince one another, they must make the pragmatic assumption that they 
allow their ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses to be influenced solely by the force of 
the better argument. (Habermas, 1993: 31)  
 
The conditions that are presented to be part of the procedure are indeed values of the 
procedure which constitute substantive aspects of the theory. Rawls comments:  
Here are five values that offhand seem to be values of the procedure – 
impartiality and equality, openness (no one and no relevant information is 
excluded) and lack of coercion, and unanimity – which in combination 
guide discussion to generalizable interests to the agreement of all 
participants. This outcome is certainly substantive, since it refers to a 
situation in which citizens’ generalizable interests are fulfilled. (Rawls, 
1996: 425)  
 
The considered outcome of the procedure of discourse ethics is thought to bring 
about reasonable results even the discussion in the public sphere is about substantive 
judgments. In this sense discourse ethics is designed in line with its expected 
outcome. According to Habermas, the results of a democratic procedure are likely to 
be reasonable. Rawls argues that considering an idea of reasonableness indicates a 
substantive value depending on the outcome of the procedure.  
 
 
5.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 The core of the debate between Rawls and Habermas is realized around the 
public use of reason. This is so, because both philosophers used similar devices of 
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representation in constructing their view for public use of reason. Rawls and 
Habermas share the same starting point from Kant’s practical philosophy in 
considering the public use of reason. It may be argued that Kant’s formula in 
developing public use of reason is categorical imperative as universal moral law. 
However the employment of categorical imperative is undesirable for both Rawls 
and Habermas because the categorical imperative is embedded in Kant’s moral 
philosophy. In order to avoid comprehensive moral arguments, Rawls and Habermas 
revised categorical imperative with a similar aim to bring about procedural devices 
of representation.  
… Habermas’s idea of a ‘discourse ethics’ can be viewed as a 
reconstruction of Kant’s idea of practical reason in terms of communicative 
reason. Roughly speaking, it involves a procedural reformulation of the 
Categorical Imperative. (McCarthy, 1994: 45)  
 
In Rawlsian approach, categorical imperative is revised by introducing the idea of 
original position. Original position is an attempt to develop a formal mental 
procedure for a political conception of justice where participants are divided by 
differences in worlds views, interests and incomes. Original position and ideal 
discourse situation are initial conditions for the construction of the general theory in 
democratic deliberation. According to Habermas, original position deprives persons 
of their practical reasoning through veil of ignorance. Knowledge available in the 
original position and knowledge required for public reason contradicts with each 
other bringing a paradox in terms of citizens. Against this critique, Rawls responds 
with the revision of original position in a four-stage sequence in which differing 
levels of knowledge is available for persons.  
 Overlapping consensus in Rawls’s theory indicates the neutrality as well as 
political nature of public reason in terms of different contending comprehensive 
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worldviews in society which are supposed to be non-public and non-political, i.e. 
moral, economic. Habermas argues that overlapping consensus is problematic in 
defining justification of Rawls’s theory. Habermas asks whether overlapping 
consensus contributes to the justification of the theory, or it contributes to the 
stability of society. Rawls replied this question by stating that overlapping consensus 
accomplishes both justification and stability. The basic reason of dispute on this 
point is different concerns of two philosophers. Habermas has paid more attention to 
the issues of legitimacy, justification and validity in modern societies. Rawls rather 
deals with the conceptualization of justice and he has been interested in constructing 
conditions for a just society following Kant’s moral theory. Another difference is 
that while Habermas remains to be Kantian when he argues that there can be a 
morally true claim, Rawls is skeptical about this issue, since he remains to be a 
liberal in the sense of Mill who states that one cannot establish the truth of a claim 
as long as the rights are prior to goods. Although Rawls is interested in justification 
of the theory, it is not his main concern. The case is also true for stability. Rawls 
replies to state that overlapping consensus contributes to stability for the right 
reasons. There is a similar case for the dispute on the conception of reasonable. 
Habermas considered reasonable in terms of moral validity claims. However, Rawls 
does not consider questions of moral validity and simply asserts that it is not his 
concern. Rawls overrules concerns for moral validity claims by developing the 
argument for the conception of the political. The conception of the political 
overrules a search for truth claims, so that comprehensive worldviews does not 
prone to argue validity claims. Stating this position is enough for Rawls to escape 
from considerations of moral validity and truth claims. For Kant only moral law can 
be known that is universal. Heteronymous claims to moral validity cannot be known 
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or cannot be universal. For Habermas scope of validity is much larger than Kant’s 
scope. Habermas is a moral cognitivist whereas Kant is not. In a similar line of 
thought Rawls is not a moral cognitivist18.  
 In the concerns for public and private autonomy, it is difficult to distinguish 
between Rawls and Habermas, since they share basics of Kantian understanding of 
autonomy. The dispute arises in the revisions of the understanding of autonomy. 
According to Habermas Kantian understanding of autonomy does not consider 
intersubjective realm. Similarly, closer to Kant’s conception, Habermas argues that 
Rawls fails to consider the role of intersubjective realm. For Rawls, Kantian 
understanding of autonomy is revised along the lines of revision from categorical 
imperative to original position. Rawls attempts to define public and non-public 
spheres and strictly limits public uses of reason, whereas for Habermas the public 
sphere is conceptualized in a way that it can include every aspect of society. 
Nonetheless, there can be possible agreements between two different approaches. 
The point is that approaches of two philosophers should be taken into consideration 
in terms of their concerns and problems. Different concerns bring different 
approaches and different conceptualizations. Also, different paths for revising 
Kantian ideal of autonomy and applying Kantian practical philosophy to politics 
seem to be the reasons behind two split. In this sense, most parts of this debate are 
not resolvable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 I have to indicate this point to reduce confusion on the subject matter. I am thankful to Cem Deveci 
for his comments o this topic.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 The debate between Rawls and Habermas indicates that public uses of reason 
comprise an important part of any democratic theory. The reason is the fact that 
public reason defines the principles of relations between state and its citizens and 
among citizens themselves. The idea of public reason is defined by Rawls as: 
To begin: in a democratic society public reason is the reason of equal 
citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive 
power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution. 
(Rawls, 1996: 214) 
 
Nevertheless, Rawls’s interpretation of public reason finds its place in political 
theory as a continuation of an already studied subject matter. In this sense, I argue 
that Rousseau’s, Mill’s and Kant’s contributions influenced Rawls’s point of view to 
an important extent. In comparison to Habermas, Rawls’s theory seems to be more 
loyal to past thinkers.  
 According to Rousseau, a person’s giving up his right at the expense of the 
community is the only way for him to be social and free at the same time. The 
common good is essentially important and the realization of common good is 
accomplished through the general will. General will is, at the mental level, sum of 
all wills except particular interests. General will is realized in a society in which 
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citizens are the legislators of their own laws. Although Rousseau did not develop a 
specific conception of public reason, the process that regulates the relations among 
citizens in the legislature should be in a certain way. Rousseau appeals to public 
deliberation in the legislative process. When general will is appeared in the public, it 
is to regulate almost all matters in society. The definition of government for 
Rousseau  indicates this condition: “What then is government? An intermediary 
body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual dealings, 
charged with the execution of the laws and with the maintenance of liberty, both 
civic and political.” (SC: 118) In the process of general will formation citizens 
deliberate without any constraints or any regulative ideal and eventually they live 
with the laws that they themselves legislate as a result of deliberative process and 
general will formation. This point is one important point where Rousseau’s 
successors like Kant would try to develop deeper level analysis.  
 Rousseau’s interpretations on limiting rights at the expense of common good 
are not readily acceptable for many liberal thinkers. Against the will of all, liberals 
like John Stuart Mill championed the rights of individual. According to Mill, 
individual can only be free as long as his basic rights are secured through legitimate 
means against the tyranny of majority. These basic rights are liberty of conscience, 
liberty of thought and feeling, freedom of opinion, liberty of tastes and pursuits and 
freedom of association. (Mill, 1991: 31) Democracy should not become the rule of 
majority as the process of voting might bring about. Rawls is influenced from Mill’s 
point in terms of the idea of priority of right. After Rousseau’s influence on 
developing an argument favoring liberty of ancients which are, equal political 
liberties and values of public life, Rawls comes into terms with liberty of moderns 
which are freedom of thought and conscience, certain basic rights of the person, and 
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the rule of law to make a compromise between the two. In Political Liberalism, both 
civic liberties and individual liberties are favored in compromise.   
 In line with Rousseau’s arguments Kant proceeds with a more elaborate 
conception for finding a regulative framework for a genuine moral principle in the 
society. In this sense, Kant tries to construct a moral commitment device. This 
device might be Kantian categorical imperative that leads the individual to act in 
accordance with a universal moral principle. Following Rousseau’s and Kant’s 
positions, both Rawls and Habermas developed devices of representation, the 
original position with the veil of ignorance in Rawls’s case and the discourse 
principle in Habermas’s. However, Rawls and Habermas interpreted this device of 
representation in different terms.  
 According to Rawls, the original position aims at indicating the conditions of 
living in the society from the viewpoint of other citizens. It contributes to the 
development of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and other regarding citizens. In 
public deliberation only the citizens are included into the process who accept 
comprehensive doctrines which endorse the idea of public reason. This is to ensure 
the overlapping consensus which contributes to the stability and validity of the 
constitutional democracy.  
 For Habermas, the discourse principle provides the rules of public discussion 
which only regulates the procedural conditions. He aims at reaching a final 
compromise for the common good in society. For this purpose, Habermas tries to 
include all issues into the process of public use of reason as long as citizens abide 
with the rules of communication. However, his ideal to reach a final point can be 
understood in terms of reaching a specific kind of society as Kant presumed. At one 
point Habermas is more inclusive in the process than Rawls but at another point 
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Rawls seems more open to changing circumstances than Habermas. The basic point 
of disagreement appears in their major endeavors. Rawls aims at developing a 
conception that will enable various comprehensive doctrines to live together without 
some strategic compromise but with an idea of overlapping consensus. Habermas 
aims at finding conditions for validity of moral truth claims in society through 
communicatively regulated measures.  
 As I have outlined an important point of disagreement between Rawls and 
Habermas is their definition of public. For Rawls, public is defined with limits to 
concern only political matters. Political matters are also defined as the issues of 
basic justice and constitutional essentials. For Habermas, the public includes many 
aspects of social life. Public sphere is: “[A] network for communicating information 
and points of view; the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and 
synthesized in such a way they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public 
opinions.” (Habermas, 1996: 360) This kind of definition for public sphere include 
many aspects of society unlike Rawls’s conception. For Rawls, limiting public 
reason is crucial to limit unreasonable comprehensive doctrines that jeopardize the 
balance of the overlapping consensus. The compromise on the issue of definition of 
public is not easy to achieve between Rawls and Habermas.  
 It may be argued that an important distinction in Rawls’s and Habermas’s 
viewpoints arises due to the differences between analytic and continental 
philosophy. Although Rawls has important impressions from the continental 
thought, his reasoning in Political Liberalism follows the main guidelines of analytic 
philosophy. On the other hand, Habermas’s theory as a whole corresponds to the 
continental tradition. The important point to note is that Rawls’s point is more open 
to compromise with the viewpoints from continental philosophy than Habermas’s 
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point with analytic philosophy. In other words, Rawls’s theory carries characteristics 
of both philosophical traditions. “… [T]he principles of justice are defended not 
with reference to a neutral (game theoretic) model of rational choice, but with 
reference to a ‘model conception’ of the person as a free and equal moral being.” 
(Baynes, 1992: 3) If there is a project to look for a compromise between the 
philosophical traditions of analytic and continental philosophy the debate between 
Rawls and Habermas can be seen as an important milestone.  
 In this thesis I believe that I have clarified the idea of public reason in the 
context of deliberative democracy. Understanding public reason is crucial to grasp 
not only the most basic issue of debate between Rawls and Habermas but also 
because it contributes to the development of theory of deliberative democracy for a 
compromise in the formation of an idea that is to regulate relations between state 
and citizens and between citizens themselves. In the context of Rawls’s approach, 
this thesis indicates philosophical roots of the idea of public reason in political 
theory. Furthermore, this thesis argued that public use of reason is essential to 
ground and maintain the legitimacy and stability of a pluralistic, deliberative 
democracy.  
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